The Ma’rib Dam (pictured below) is in many ways symbolic of the nation of Yemen. It stands as a testament to the great ancient civilisation that built the massive structure in the ninth-century BC. With its reservoir, the dam turned the desert into arable land with luscious gardens and green fields, in turn allowing the Yemeni civilisation to flourish. Yet, the dam also serves as a metaphor for the current ills that plague the nation. By the first century AD the dam had begun to break, and when it finally collapsed in 542, it devasted the local land, triggering famine and widespread migration. The devastation caused by the dam’s collapse and the subsequent desertification of the local lands was so catastrophic that it made it into the Quran as a divine punishment sent by god. Today this cycle of successful water management, decline and eventual turmoil is again playing out in Yemen.

The crisis in Yemen is currently the largest humanitarian disaster in the world. This human tragedy is a direct effect of the ongoing civil conflict which has taken place there for the last five years. While Western mainstream media is mainly interested in the role Western nations play in the Saudi Arabian-led coalition (SLC), and their attack on the Houthi Rebels, the Yemeni population’s water situation is less widely addressed. This article looks at the link between water scarcity and conflict during the current civil war. However, before exploring this relationship, it serves to take a cursory look at Yemen’s history and the background of the civil war.

^ Source: Wikimedia Commons

Historical background

Before the conflict, Yemen was already the poorest country in the Middle East, suffering from the worst malnutrition rate in the world, with half of the population unable to access clean potable water. This region was not always one of the most water-scarce countries in the world, however. Historically, the civilisations in Yemen prospered due to great dams and the capture of rainwater. Thus, Yemen was referred to in antiquity as ‘Arabia Felix’, or ‘Fortunate Arabia’. It is then no surprise that the most successful early Yemeni settlements were concentrated along with the majority of the nation’s precipitation in the western mountainous regions. Still, ancient Yemen was not without water struggles. When the Sabaean Kingdom expanded from the 11^th Century BC to cover the areas further south around modern-day Aden, they could not unite all the tribes on the peninsula due to the vast arid regions scarce of water. Nevertheless, the Sabaean people maintained control of trade through the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb for many centuries. They used their new wealth to construct water infrastructure projects, including several dams in the Sarawat Mountains. Since this time of nominal national stability, Yemen has gone through various periods of dynastical rule and different empires, punctuated by unrest and cycles of violent struggles between kingdoms and tribes for control of power.

Unlike its ancient history, Yemen’s modern history is less one of stable regimes and more one of revolt and conflict. Yemen became a unified state in 1990. However, in the mid-2000s Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, the spiritual and military leader of the Zaidi Shia sect began an insurgency against the Yemen government arguing that they were ‘defending against persecution’. Meanwhile, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), the most active branch of Al Qaeda, gained traction in Yemen and the government enacted several measures against them, even declaring war on the extremist group.

In 2011, the Yemeni Uprising, which coincided with the Arab Spring, rose in opposition against Yemen’s president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s governance. An intense conflict ensued between the government and the opposition groups. This resulted in the fall of the Saleh government and subsequent election of acting president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was the only candidate in the February 2012 elections. However, Hadi could not stabilise the country, and in 2014 the Houthi rebels toppled the government in the capital Sana’a. While Houthis took control of the capital, President Hadi, who had resigned, fled to Aden and gathered support forming the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Civil unrest has since torn Yemen apart, with little signs of a ceasefire. The turmoil in the region coupled with the Houthi’s Shia based faith triggered an intervention led by Saudi Arabia with broad international support. Utilising its sophisticated arsenal of weapons, Saudi Arabia has targeted insurgents with a series of missile and airstrikes which has destroyed vital infrastructure and claimed the lives of 6872 civilians and wounded another 10768 as of 2018.  Furthermore, Iran, seeing how many resources Saudi Arabia was pouring into the conflict, has since increased financial and military support for the Houthis in an attempt to threaten Saudi Arabia from a new front and bog down her forces in Yemen. All of this has escalated the conflict and made any resolution more difficult.

Causes and effects of water scarcity

Pre-existing water stress was driven by a combination of many factors, such as poor governance and climate change. This stress has been exacerbated in modern times because the agricultural sector, which historically engaged primarily in subsistence farming, has largely shifted its focus to the production of the recreational drug known as Khat. Khat wields up to six times more profit than food crops but is also more water intensive. Ninety three percent of Yemen’s potable water is being used for agriculture, and Khat uses up almost half of this. This large amount of freshwater could otherwise be used to produce food crops or help abate the country’s dire water situation. However, the drug’s profitability, widespread poverty and Khat’s customary consumption in Yemeni culture has allowed Khat production to account for roughly 10 percent of the Yemeni economy.

The additional destruction of critical infrastructure, brought about by the civil war, has had a catastrophic effect on civilian access to water. Long-term political instability has hindered the development of critical civilian infrastructure, and the pre-existing infrastructure has become vulnerable due to unrest. Furthermore, these vulnerabilities have been magnified by entrenched socio-technical and socio-ecological factors which predate the explosion of unrest.

In 2016, the lack of clean water for cleaning and consumption led to a large scale cholera outbreak in Yemen. This outbreak continued into late 2020 since there has been little to any significant increase in access to clean water. With the added pressure from the COVID-19 pandemic that reached Yemen by early 2020, its health care system has practically collapsed.

 Water weaponisation

While lack of access to basic amenities and the provision of essential public services is a direct effect of the long-protracted conflict, access to water has also been proactively exploited as a coercive means of control by several groups. Subnational extremist groups such as the Houthis who claim to represent the interests of the people have used coercive weaponisation of water sources to bolster their claim. In a country with limited access to fresh water, political control over the scarce resource confers a significant source of legitimacy to any party. This has allowed vital water infrastructure to fall into disrepair or varying states of misgovernance as different factions vie for control over it. As a clear sign of rebel authority and legitimacy, such facilities have also become effective bombing targets of the SLC in their effort to oust the Houthis.

Several aid organisations, like the Yemen Relief and Reconstruction Fund, have sent much needed humanitarian relief in the form of medicine, food, and WASH facilities. However, the delivery of these vital resources has posed a significant challenge. Much to international observers’ frustration, aid sent does not always reach those in need, primarily because of barriers imposed by various rebel groups. Furthermore, the SLC has backed a blockade of Yemen, which has seen the closure of the main entry ports such as Sana’a, Aden international airports and Hodaydah seaport to civilian traffic. This has directly hindered any aid efforts. Fuel imports have been all but cut off, which has significantly heightened transportation costs and made the delivery of aid exceptionally difficult. Furthermore, humanitarian aid is subject to long waiting times in order to pass checkpoints due to an overcomplicated and often duplicated administrative systems and a lack of continuity between the authorities of different cities and governates. As such, all forms of public services have ceased, causing prices of essential commodities to skyrocket beyond the average purchasing power.

Tensions arising from power competition and scarcity of basic resources were present at all levels of Yemeni society prior to the official breakout of civil war. The civil war has heightened several of these tribal and ethnic struggles, adding another dimension to the complex political situation. The conflict has also allowed actors with ties to key belligerents to amass wealth and control of resources. This newly assumed power is entrenched in the war economy, which further perpetuates the humanitarian crisis. As a result, a political settlement and an end to the conflict is not in such groups’ interests; neither is it directly in the interest of nations who benefit from arms deals with Saudi Arabia or the Houthis.

Conclusion

With proper and effective water governance in Yemen, the nation can maintain a certain level of water stability. This has proven attainable in the past, yet with an increased population, other policies and technologies must also be explored. With improvements in technology regarding waste treatment, water retention and distribution, Yemen’s limited freshwater resources can be optimised. However, the extent that recreational consumption of Khat is embedded in Yemeni culture may be a severe challenge in the country’s pursuance of water stability, as agriculture continues to take up the majority of available water. Furthermore, these changes require a stable political environment and a national government.

In the short term, policymakers look to broker a political agreement between belligerents to end the conflict and suffering. However, with mounting medical and sanitary pressures in the form of COVID-19 and Cholera, aid should act as a precursor to a political settlement instead of the other way round. This would entail an end to the blockade and a significant overhaul of the current fragmented systems and checks that have obstructed access to civilians who are in the greatest need. De-incentivising the current ad-hoc state of governance, where civilian access to essential services is being held hostage, is key to allowing a legitimate government to establish an operational system whereby the provision of basic needs are available to all.

Perhaps the most important lesson to draw from Yemen is how water when scarce becomes a political asset and means of legitimacy. Yemen’s plight may serve as a forewarning for things to come. The growing prevalence of water scarcity and environmental degradation across the globe is the perfect recipe for disaster in countries already troubled by fragile national governments, ethnic tensions and insufficient water infrastructure. When faced with insufficient support, they, much like the ancient Ma’rib Dam can collapse, and plunge their own region into chaos.

About the Author:

Jake Liddle holds an MA in Applied Security and Strategy. He did Chinese Studies at the University of Sheffield, before becoming an associate editor at a legal and investment firm in Shanghai.