The Nile is arguably the most iconic river in the world and has nourished civilizations in North Africa for thousands of years. However, disagreements over access to these vital waters is driving a wedge between the nations which depend upon the Nile for their economic prosperity. Most prominently, the near completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is souring relations between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan.

The GERD is the largest hydroelectric dam project in Africa. The Dam, which is situated on the Blue Nile amid the Northern Ethiopian Highlands, is expected to cost $4 billion to construct with a projected capacity of over 6,000 megawatts. It has been a bone of contention between Ethiopia and the downstream countries of Egypt and Sudan since plans for its construction were announced in 2011. 

The strategic importance of the Nile, which passes through 11 countries, is hard to overstate. Ethiopia enjoys the geostrategic advantage of being situated upstream of the river and is therefore better placed to control the flow of water with man-made infrastructure like dams. The GERD, which is nearing completion, will allow Ethiopia to benefit economically from this geostrategic advantage, but it could also threaten to destabilise the water security of downstream states. 

According to a 2020 report conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO):

 ‘The Nile River Basin faces a huge challenge in terms of water security. With an expected doubling of the population in the basin in the next twenty five years, water supply in the basin will be further depleted as demands for agriculture, domestic and industry continues to grow. Water availability in the basin will also be threatened by climate change and variability and pollution from increased agricultural and industrial activities and from urban areas.’

Evidently, the GERD will play an important role in determining the balance of power between the nations of the Nile Basin. Competition for hydro-hegemony and scarce resources threatens to destabilise the region, but it could also force states faced with water scarcity to cooperate through regional institutions like the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). 

Egypt’s Position

Egypt has long ruled as the regional hydro-hegemon and has historically enjoyed the greatest influence over the Nile’s resources. It was only after Egypt had been rocked by revolution and the toppling of the Mubarak government in the early months of 2011 that Ethiopia unveiled its plans for the GERD. Egypt was too distracted by domestic strife to effectively counter Ethiopia’s challenge to its hydro-hegemony.

In Egyptian strategic thinking, the GERD poses a very real existential threat. The Blue Nile, on which the GERD is situated, provides Egypt with 85% of its freshwater. Egypt is concerned that when the GERD’s reservoir is filled, Egypt will receive less than the 55.5 billion cubic meters of water it is dependent on annually. 

During negotiations, Egyptian officials have called upon Ethiopia to fill the GERD’s reservoir over a longer period to prevent water shortages further downstream. However, Ethiopia is resolute to adhere to its six-year timetable for filling the reservoir. In July 2020, Ethiopia began filling the reservoir.

Regarding water security, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has said, it is a ‘matter of life and death’, and that, ‘no one can touch Egypt’s share of the water’. 

Egypt depends on water primarily drawn from the Nile to sustain a population of over 100 million people. Nearly 12% of Egypt’s economy is made up by the agricultural sector which is responsible for the employment of approximately 6.5 million Egyptians. Egyptian farmers have bemoaned poor fertility caused by water scarcity for decades. Now the GERD, together with global warming and a growing regional population threatens to exacerbate that issue.

Historically, Egypt has relied on diplomacy and international legal frameworks to protect its interests in the Nile Basin. Egyptian officials have often pointed to the 1929 and 1959 treaties as the basis for their privileged access to the Nile.

 The 1929 Nile Treaty Agreement signed between Great Britain and Egypt granted highly favourable terms to the latter. According to the terms of the agreement, Egypt has the right to undertake projects on the Nile River without consent from the upper riparian states. More importantly in the context of the GERD debacle, paragraph 27 of the treaty grants Egypt veto power over any construction projects on the Nile. 

Egypt would however struggle to impose the terms of the 1929 treaty without resorting to military force or coercion. The treaty, which was signed between Egypt and imperial Britain, has largely lost its perceived legitimacy due to its colonial context. It would be counterproductive for the upstream states of the Nile Basin to recognise a colonial-era treaty which privileges Egypt with unilateral action across a river spanning 11 states.

In 1959, Egypt and Sudan signed a bilateral agreement which built upon the foundations of the 1929 Nile Treaty Agreement. The 1959 agreement did grant Sudan a share of the water, at 18.5 billion cubic meters per year, but failed to recognise the needs of any other riparian states, including Ethiopia. Moreover, the treaty granted Egypt the right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water annually, further strengthening Egypt’s position on the Nile. 

It is according to the terms of the 1959 treaty that Egypt has argued its right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of Nile water each year has been threatened. The Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation has insisted that Egypt requires an absolute minimum of 40 billion cubic meters of water each year, which is the average flow of water during droughts, but this is far from an optimal amount given Egypt’s already insufficient water supply.

Military action is unlikely but not unquestionable. During the summer months of 2020, an Egyptian delegation allegedly visited Somaliland to set up an overseas military base within striking distance of Ethiopia. That same year, Trump controversially suggested that Egypt might ‘blow up’ the dam. Trump’s comment was tactless but not entirely unfeasible.

Military action remains unlikely. Egypt is faced with insecurity on its western border with Libya, which has been torn apart by civil war. Meanwhile, an insurgency in Egypt’s Sinai region has proven difficult for the security services to quash. An Egyptian military operation in Ethiopia seems like a stretch too far considering the immediate threats facing Egypt closer to home

Sudan’s Position

Sudan shares similar concerns with Egypt that the GERD will choke off its water supply. Like Egypt, Sudan already faces problems imposed by water scarcity – an issue which is likely to be exacerbated by climate change and desertification.

According to statistics from 2019, the agricultural sector accounts for over 28% of Sudan’s GDP. Approximately 60% of the workforce are employed in agriculture. Sudanese officials are therefore worried that the GERD could worsen water shortages and decimate the economy.

The government in Khartoum is also concerned that the GERD could threaten the safe operation of Sudan’s own infrastructure on the Blue Nile. A decrease in the amount of water flowing downstream from the GERD could damage the turbines of the Roseires dam, which supplies Sudan with 1,800 megawatts of energy and plays an important role in irrigation.

Nevertheless, Sudan been more receptive to the GERD than Egypt. Former Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir even voiced support for the dam to Ethiopian representatives in 2012. If Ethiopia can calm Sudan’s fears that the GERD will cause havoc downstream, the latter may be more supportive of the project. Egypt and Sudan have already fallen out in the past over Khartoum’s lukewarm attitude towards the dam, contrasted with Cairo’s frostier stance.

Another factor is that Sudanese officials seem more convinced by Ethiopian arguments that the downstream states could benefit from the GERD. One potential benefit is that the GERD could increase the life expectancy of Sudanese dams downstream by removing silt and sedimentation from the water. 

However, Ethiopia’s recent decision to resume filling the dam this year in July, with or without an agreement, has angered officials in Khartoum, who have voiced their objections to the African Union (AU). Sudanese officials have insisted on a data-sharing agreement between Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt, to ensure the flow of water downstream is safely managed, especially during the filling phase of the dam’s reservoir.

Fighting, which began in November last year, between the Ethiopian central government in Addis Ababa and the Tigray-based Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) has done nothing to improve relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Sudan was forced to reinforce its eastern flank bordering Ethiopia as thousands of refugees fled the fighting to seek shelter in Sudan.

In December 2020, the government in Khartoum alleged that several Sudanese soldiers were ambushed and killed by Ethiopian forces ‘inside Sudanese territory’. The Sudanese soldiers had been patrolling the border when they were attacked. 

The disputed al-Fashqa Plain could also further complicate relations between Sudan and Ethiopia. Ethiopian farmers belonging to the Amhara ethnic group have frequently clashed with Sudanese farmers over the land, particularly during the planting and harvesting seasons. Instability caused by the conflict in Tigray could easily exacerbate tensions elsewhere.

Should Ethiopia’s internal divisions spill over into Sudan, the government in Khartoum - which is faced with divisions of its own – will have few incentives to cooperate with Addis Ababa on the GERD.

Given both Sudan and Egypt’s objections to the GERD, or at the least, Ethiopia’s unilateral handling of it, the two might appear obvious allies. However, Egypt and Sudan have also been thwarted by disagreements, with the former accusing the latter of supporting Ethiopia. An Ethiopian paper even reported that Egypt had proposed excluding Sudan from future GERD negotiations in late-2017, although this claim has not been substantiated. Earlier that year, then-President of Sudan, al-Bashir accused Egypt of supporting rebels in Darfur against the government in Khartoum. Tense relations between the two countries have prevented them from consistently negotiating with Ethiopia from a united front.

Ethiopia’s Position

Ethiopia is naturally keen to complete the construction of the GERD and fill the dam’s reservoir. Ethiopian officials have largely dismissed Egyptian and Sudanese fears that the GERD will impact the flow of water downstream and have argued that Ethiopians have an intrinsic right to benefit from the natural resources present in their own country.

In July 2020, when the first filling phase was completed, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reiterated that the project did not harm other riparian states when he said: ‘We have successfully completed the first dam filling without bothering and hurting anyone else. Now the dam is overflowing downstream’. 

Despite assurances that the dam will not deplete the supply of water downstream, Ethiopia has refused to recognise Egypt’s right to 55.5 billion cubic meters of water annually. Addis Ababa has long maintained that the 1929 and 1959 agreements fail to acknowledge Ethiopia’s rights and needs for resources on the Nile.

What seems clear now that Ethiopia is set to resume filling the dam’s reservoir this summer, is that Ethiopia will move ahead with the GERD project unilaterally, irrespective of objections by Egypt or Sudan.

Policy makers in Addis Ababa see the GERD as an essential element of the country’s economic growth. Completing the GERD would help bring energy to the remaining 55% or so of the Ethiopian population who still do not have access to electricity. It is therefore unlikely that Ethiopian officials will be prepared to make any serious concessions regarding the GERD unless absolutely compelled to do so. 

A History of Failed Negotiations

There have been several attempts to reach an understanding between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan since the GERD was announced in 2011. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI), which was founded in 1999, provides a forum for riparian states to discuss issues relating to the Nile but has so far failed to produce ana agreement. Talks arranged by the AU have likewise failed to bring about a satisfactory arrangement.

The latest round of negotiations began on 3 January this year and ended in failure yet again on 10 January. This time, both Egypt and Ethiopia blamed Sudan for the failure of the negotiations. 

The failure of negotiations this January was nothing new. In 2012 an international panel of experts was set up to assess the dam. Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan supplied two experts each, in addition to a further four international experts. In 2013 the experts released a report which recommended additional studies to determine the impacts of the dam. Seeking an expert opinion was a logical step for the three riparian countries, but it did little to help them reach an agreement.

In 2014 the Tripartite National Committee was set up between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to conduct the further studies regarding the dam. However, these studies were never completed.

In 2015, there was some progress when the three countries signed the Declaration of Principles on the GERD. This agreement set out ten principles that Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan are expected to abide by regarding the GERD. Principles such as the ‘Principle of Cooperation’, and the ‘Principle of Not Causing Significant Harm’, were set out with the intention of ending the GERD dispute. Unfortunately, subsequent negotiations have failed to produce tangible results in line with these principles.

In 2018 the National Independent Research Study Group was created by leading members of the intelligence services, foreign ministries, and water ministries from all three countries to explore solutions for the GERD dispute. This round of negotiations also failed.

In 2019 talks resumed yet again, this time observed by the US Treasury and the World Bank. In February 2020, Ethiopia refused to sign a draft agreement proposed by Egypt on the basis that the US Treasury and World Bank had drafted terms which unfairly favoured Egypt.

In April 2020, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed advanced an agreement which addressed the first two years of filling. Egypt and Sudan both rejected this agreement. Two months later another attempt at reaching a deal also failed.

Difficult Compromises

Reaching a peaceful and mutually beneficial agreement on the GERD is essential for the peace and prosperity of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Moreover, it would establish a positive precedent for the wider Nile Basin, which is set to face challenges imposed by shifting demographics and climate change. To reach such an agreement will require the three countries to all make some difficult compromises.

Egypt will have to relinquish some of its power over the Nile which has established it as a hydro-hegemon in favour of a more multilateral approach. In real terms, Egypt will not be relinquishing much power at all, given the fact that Ethiopia will proceed with the completion of the GERD, with or without consent from Cairo. Egypt could attempt to derail the GERD project altogether with military action, but this would be highly risky and could easily backfire.

Ethiopia must take Egypt and Sudan’s fears seriously that the GERD could have negative impacts downstream. Vague assurances that the dam will not reduce the flow of water is not going to win over policy makers in Egypt and Sudan. Although Ethiopian officials are right to point out that they are entitled to benefit from resources found in their own country, the consequences of the GERD could be felt far from the borders of Ethiopia. In the same way that Egypt must adopt a more multilateral approach to the entire Nile, Ethiopia must adopt a more multilateral approach to the construction and operation of the GERD.

More broadly, the GERD is just one piece of the increasingly complex puzzle that is water politics in the Nile Basin. Issues such as water scarcity, desertification, and growing populations will only make managing resources in the region more difficult. Moving forward, Professor John Mukum Mbaku’s suggestion that all 11 Nile riparian states ‘agree on a legal regime for the management of this important watercourse’ makes a lot of sense.