Rising Tensions Between Greece and Turkey Threaten to Plunge the Aegean into Conflict

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Alexander Gale

21 September 2020

Greece and Turkey have always regarded each other with mutual suspicion but tensions have not run this high since the Imia/Kardak crisis in 1995, which nearly led to war.

Animosity between Greece and Turkey has erupted over territorial waters in the Aegean, rich with natural gas reserves. The list of grievances between the two countries, which primarily concerned Greece and Turkey's tug of war for Cyprus, has grown to encompass broader strategic interests in the wider Mediterranean and has drawn in other actors, like France, Libya, Egypt and Israel. With both sides willing to deploy military assets, a miscalculation could very well lead the two NATO members into a precarious hot incident, or even a war.

The Situation

Tensions came to a head on 21 July when Turkey indicated its intentions via NAVTEX to deploy the Oruç Reis survey vessel to carry out underwater seismic surveys for natural resources in a part of the Mediterranean which predominately falls under Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This was perceived as a provocation and direct threat to Greek sovereignty by officials in Athens.

The survey vessel was proceeded by a group of at least 18 Turkish warships which sailed ahead to an area not far from the Greek island of Kastellorizo. Meanwhile, the Greek military was put on high alert and deployed naval assets to block the progression of Turkish vessels. Forces were also deployed in Evros, Greece’s north-easternmost border region with Turkey.

On the 22 July, mock dog fights occurred between Greek and Turkish aircraft over Kastellorizo. Non-lethal aerial engagements of this kind between Greek and Turkish aviators are relatively common, although this episode lasted longer than is typical at approximately two and a half hours.

For now, further escalations in the disputed waters have not arisen, but the Greek military remains on the defensive and its presence has been reinforced in Kastellorizo, where Greek President Katerina Sakellaropoulou recently made a visit to celebrate the island's liberation from fascist Italian rule during the Second World War.

The Aegean Dispute

Talks were held between Greek and Turkish military officials at NATO's headquarters in Brussels on 15 September, following calls by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to find a 'deconflicting mechanism' to prevent further incidents between the two countries.

The dialogue in Brussels indicates that both sides are cautious to prevent a hot incident, but it is highly unlikely that the underlying issues plaguing Greek and Turkish relations will be resolved in a conclusive manner.

This is because neither country can agree on which mechanism to measure the limits of their respective EEZs. As a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Athens marks its maritime boundaries as extending from Greece's many islands, which number over 3,000. Ankara is not a signatory to UNCLOS and prefers to negotiate boundaries on a bilateral basis. Given that Turkey only owns three islands in the Aegean, Ankara argues that Greece and Turkey's EEZs should be measured from their mainlands and the islands should be ignored altogether.

According to UNCLOS, a country is entitled to claim an EEZ of up to 12 nautical miles from its coast. However, Turkey has previously warned that if Greece or the Republic of Cyprus were to extend their claimed territorial waters from the current six nm miles to 12 nm, this would constitute a cause for war. So far, both Greece and Cyprus have refrained from doing so.

Athens has long regarded Ankara as an existential threat, especially since the 1974 invasion of Cyprus. Even before the current crisis came to a head, Athens was alarmed in 2017 by President Erdoğan's public disapproval of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which largely delineated the present Greek-Turkish borders. Years of distrust have fomented a highly defensive strategic posture towards Turkey. Greek thinking can be surmised as, give Turkey an inch and they'll take a mile. Athens essentially views competition with Ankara in the Aegean as a zero-sum game.

The stakes are equally high for a resurgent Turkey. If Ankara can assert its own interpretation of territorial waters in the Aegean, Turkey's economy will benefit from access to lucrative hydrocarbons. If however, Greece is able to go ahead with the EastMed pipeline, which would involve cooperation with Israel, Cyprus, Egypt and the Palestinian authority but exclude Turkey; Ankara risks being cut off from maritime resources in the Aegean. Moreover, the Turks have long feared maritime ensnarement formed by a 'Greek lake' in the Aegean, which could prevent Turkish naval and civilian vessels from operating freely.

Strategic Competition

Ankara's push to assert itself in the Aegean forms a part of its broader 'Blue Homeland' doctrine, which aims to establish Turkey as a more dominant maritime power. According to former Turkish admiral Cem Gürdeniz and one of the principal authors of the doctrine, Turkey's ambition is to command greater control over the three seas around it: the Aegean, the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Turkey's naval and diplomatic manoeuvres to expand its control of the Aegean at the expense of Greece and Cyprus are to be expected from this new strategic direction, which will increasingly see Ankara bump heads with its neighbors.

Although Erdoğan is increasingly eager to flex Turkey's military muscles, he knows Ankara must avoid an all out war in the Aegean. If Turkey presses too hard and is seen as the aggressor, he risks alienating the other NATO members and drawing Greece's European and NATO allies into a bloc against Turkey. Instead, Erdoğan will continue to pursue a hybrid strategy of military provocation and bilateral diplomacy to chip away at the Greek position in the Aegean.

Erdoğan's shrewdest move so far was to make a deal with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) last year, which outlined maritime boundaries between Turkey and Libya. The boundaries cross a large swathe of water effectively blocking the EastMed pipeline's proposed route, which would enable the transportation of gas from Israel and Cyprus into Europe.

Consequently, Greece has taken a greater interest in the Libyan Civil War, which has become a proxy between several competing actors in the region. Now that Erdoğan's support for the GNA poses a threat to Greek maritime security, Athens would prefer the House of Representative's Libyan National Army (LNA) to prevail in the conflict. To that end, Greece has provided support for the EU's Operation IRINI, which was launched this year to enforce the United Nations arms embargo on Libya. Although the operation does not directly support one side, it will frustrate Ankara's ability to supply Turkish-backed forces.

Closer to home, Athens has made an effort to build security partnerships and sure up defences in the Aegean. French President Emmanuel Macron has condemned Turkish actions and increased French military presence in the eastern Mediterranean. This follows joint naval exercises last month off the coast of Cyprus with French, Greek and Italian participation. Franco-Greek security cooperation has been further bolstered by the announcement of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to purchase 18 French-built Rafale combat aircraft as part of the plans made by the Hellenic Armed Forces to modernise equipment.

The United States, which has historically been wary of alienating Turkey, has called for a diplomatic approach to the simmering tensions between Greece and Turkey. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said during a visit to Cyprus, “We remain deeply concerned by Turkey’s ongoing operations surveying for natural resources in areas over which Greece and Cyprus assert jurisdiction over the eastern Mediterranean.”

Washington is at a crossroads regarding its relationship with Ankara. The US regards Turkey as a useful buffer on Russia's southern flank, but recent clashes of interest, such as Turkish intervention in Syria and Erdoğan's purchase of the Russian-built S400 missile system, have strained relations. It remains to be seen whether the US will try to work around its strategic differences with Turkey, attempt to realign the country with Western interests, or take a more confrontational approach to Erdoğan's regional ambitions. Undoubtedly, Washington's foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean will play a significant role in determining the future balance of power between two of the region's most quarrelsome neighbours.

Endgame

Ankara's shift to a strategy of assertive engagement has led to an impasse in Greek and Turkish relations. Since the attempted coup in particular, Erdoğan has spearheaded an increasingly bellicose foreign policy, which aims to reestablish Turkish influence in the former-Ottoman territories. The long term resolution of the Aegean dispute will depend on whether Ankara can redraw its borders with Greece, or if Athens can successfully defend the status quo.

There is a significant risk of an Aegean flashpoint sparking a conflict. Ankara does not want a war with Athens. The Turks would prefer to back the Greeks into a corner with a combination of diplomacy and military provocation. For instance, Turkish forces could attempt to cut off the Hellenic Navy from one of the Greek islands via a naval blockade, most probably Kastellorizo. Athens would then have a tough choice; either to open fire on Turkish forces and push past the blockade or enter negotiations with Ankara on the back foot. The former option is hazardous because Greek forces would have to fire first and risk being seen as the aggressors, potentially isolating them from foreign support. The latter option is no better, as Athens would essentially enter a hostage negotiation in which they would be forced to cede ground.

This is just one scenario which could materialise in the weeks, months and years that follow. What seems certain however, is that the situation will have to be monitored closely. A war in the eastern Mediterranean between two NATO members would be disastrous for the region. Even if neither side intends to further escalate, a miscalculated clash between a Greek and Turkish military asset could have far reaching consequences.

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