Fighting in Tigray

Growing animosity between Ethiopia's central government and the regional leadership in Tigray has escalated towards violence and armed conflict. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the ruling Prosperity Party have declared a six-month state of emergency and authoritsed military intervention in the region of Tigray, where the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) no longer recongnise federal authority.

Federal forces have been conducting airstrikes in Tigray since Thursday 5 November. According to Abiy, these are retaliatory strikes in response to the capture of a federal base by forces loyal to the TPLF. Facts on the ground are hard to establish but the UN has reported combat between federal and TPLF forces in at least eight different locations. Doctors Without Borders believe at least six people have been killed and a further 60 injured, as of 7 November.

On 10 November, state-run media claimed that federal troops had captured Humera Airport from Tigrayan troops, as well as a road which runs between Humera and the Sudanese border.

How Did Conflict Start?

Tensions between Abiy's government and the TPLF have been growing since November 2019. Not long into his tenure as prime minister, Abiy led the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) in its transition into the Prosperity Party. However, only three of the four EPRDF coalition members followed through with party unification.  The TPLF contended that the merger was illegal and feared that the new arrangement would undermine Ethiopia's system of ethnically-based federalism. Moreover, members of the TPLF, which had dominated Ethiopian politics since the 1990s up until Abiy's election, have accused the government of leading a witch hunt against them.

On 9 September 2020, unsanctioned elections for the regional parliament were held in Tigray. This was despite the central government's decision to postpone upcoming elections due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The TPLF however, argued that the postponement was a a ruse to unlawfully extend Abiy's mandate. In the unauthorised elections which followed, the TPLF won all but one of the 190 seats in the regional parliament.

A month later the central government ruled that federal officials should refrain from contacting regional officials in Tigray. The TPLF similarly withdrew their federal representatives in the capital, Addis Ababa. In October, Abiy made reassurances that there would be no military intervention or severe financial retaliations aimed at Tigray, but in early November the Ethiopian Parliament voted to dissolve the TPLF-led government in Tigray and has launched military operations in the region.

What Will Happen Next?

Unless both sides reach a political settlement or an external actor offers to mediate, violence in Tigray is likely to escalate. Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019 for his part in ending hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. He came into power promising to alleviate the country's long cycles of intercommunal ethnic violence and human rights abuses, and made moves to liberalise the political space by freeing prisoners and unbanning opposition groups. Nevertheless, Abiy will be anxious to restore federal authority in Tigray. If the prime minister fails to do this and the central government is perceived as weak, ethno-nationalists elsewhere in the country may be emboldened to chip away at federal authority or make a dash for independence.

Although the TPLF have called upon the African Union to intervene and prevent a civil war, they seem equally poised for further confrontation. The acting President of Tigray, Debrestion Gebremichael has said: 'we have prepared our army, our militia and our special forces. Our preparation is aimed at averting war, but if we are to fight, we are ready to win.'

Capitulation could be costly for Tigray's regional leadership. If the TPLF were to concede now, its leaders would likely face imprisonment. If the conflict escalates into a civil war and they lose, they would likewise face imprisonment or exile. However, if forces loyal to the Tigray regional government can prevent federal troops from completing any significant objectives, then the TPLF will have a much stronger position to negotiate from in any kind of peace settlement.

A lot depends on the TPLF's strategic ends, which are not entirely transparent. The TPLF have made it clear that they no longer consider Abiy's mandate to be legitimate and any move away from federalism towards a unitary system would be crossing a red line. In the months that follow, the TPLF may push for Tigrayan secession and sever ties with Addis Ababa altogether. The rights to self determination and secession are guaranteed by the Ethiopian constitution but it is extremely unlikely that the central government will allow Tigray to break away without a fight. Furthermore, the Ethiopian Parliament's decision to dissolve the Tigrayan government invalidates any legal claims the TPLF could make, at least as far as the central government is concerned.  

For civilians caught in the middle, a civil war will be catastrophic. Ethiopia already has over one million internally displaced people (IDPs) according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Significant progress had been made in cutting down the number of IDPs between 2018 and 2019 but the conflict in Tigray will likely result in a renewed spike of IDPs and refugees fleeing from Tigray.

Tigray itself, hosts roughly 100,000 IDPs and a near equal number of refugees. Six times that number of people in the region rely on food relief assistance. Further conflict will only inflate those numbers and NGOs will find it harder to deliver humanitarian assistance through combat zones, roadblocks and increasingly dangerous areas.

Could Conflict Spread Throughout the Country?

The crisis in Tigray poses the greatest challenge to federal authority, but tensions elsewhere in the country could flare up and threaten to further disrupt Ethiopian domestic security. Thus far, Abiy's premiership has not seen an end to the inter-ethnic tensions which have blighted the country for decades; nor have the various ethno-nationalist groups ceased to demand greater autonomy or outright independence.

In January last year, the government carried out a counterinsurgency campaign against Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) insurgents, primarily in the Kelem Wollega Zone of Oromiya. This happened despite a peace deal between the government and the OLF which was made in August 2018. in early November this year, Amnesty International has alleged that the OLF was responsible for the killings of 54 Amhara people, most of whom were women and children. The OLF has been blamed for a litany of crimes including banditry, rape and murder. Government forces have also been criticised for unlawful killings and torture.

In October 2019, intercommunal violence between the Amhara and Qemant peoples claimed the lives of at least 130 people in the Amhara Region. The government was either ambivalent or impotent to stop the violence, which was orchestrated by local militias and organised youth movements. Non-government organisations like Amnesty International have reported a spate of human rights abuses in the region, such as summary executions, torture and door-to-door killings.

It remains to be seen how far conflict will escalate between the TPLF and the central government in Tigray, but the latter can ill afford further domestic discord rising in the other regions. If the crisis in Tigray worsens, federal resources will be directed northwards, away from other potential flashpoints. This may leave areas of the country vulnerable to intercommunal violence or ethno-nationalists who perceive an opportunity to carve out greater regional autonomy.

Regional Impact

Ethiopia is the most powerful actor in the Horn of Africa with the second largest population on the entire continent. A civil war therefore threatens to destabilise the wider region. A protracted conflict could also draw in neighboring states.

Since the rapprochement process between Ethiopia and Eritrea in July 2018, the TPLF have been highly suspicious of the relationship between Abiy and Eritrea's long-serving President Isaias Afwerki. Isaias is an outspoken opponent of the TPLF and tensions between Eritrea and Tigrayan leaders have hardly cooled despite the peace agreement.

Eritrean military intervention is not entirely out of the question. This would pose a severe challenge to the TPLF, who would be forced to fight a two-front war against Eritrea along the northern border and federal forces largely advancing from the south. However, foreign assistance - especially from a former foe - could risk further damaging public opinions of Abiy's leadership, so he is only likely to call upon Eritrean aid if Tigrayan forces prove immovable.

Meanwhile, governments in neighbouring countries are already bracing themselves for the repercussions of a potential humanitarian disaster in Tigray. For example, local authorities in Sudan's Al Qadarif region have begun the construction of a refugee camp to accommodate Ethiopians fleeing from the conflict.

Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chairperson of the African Union Commission, has called for a halt to hostilities in Ethiopia and has said that the African Union stands in readiness 'to support an inter-Ethiopian effort in the pursuit of peace and stability.' Whether an outside body can successfully mediate between the federal government and the TPLF remains to be seen.