This arid peninsula at the southern end of Ukraine has long been considered the jewel of the Black Sea. Its strategic location, close to both the river Don and Dnipro and its deep-water ports, makes it integral to the defence and dominion over the region. This fact was understood by the ancient Greeks who established an early colony on the southern end of the peninsula and by the subsequent Roman, Byzantine, Mongolian, Ottoman, and Russian empires, all of which at one point controlled or sought to control the region.

Russia has been hard at work solidifying its grip on the region since the initial invasion and annexation. They have built infrastructure projects connecting the peninsula to the Russian mainland, increased their military presence in Sevastopol, and bolstered Crimean industry with subsidies and a massive inflow of Russian labourers. The Russian message is clear; they are there to stay.

However, across the Perekop isthmus, the Ukrainian parliament and people feel differently, and they have not remained idle. While Russia bolstered its military and economic presence on the peninsula, Kyiv focused on strengthening its European and American support, reforming its armed forces, and containing the rebels in the eastern region of the Donbas. Realising they had neither the international support, the political will, nor the military resources to reclaim the peninsula by force, they decided to utilise their ultimate natural leverage over Crimea, the access to the river Dnipro.



History of the Dnipro and Canal

The Dnipro river has, in many ways, shaped the modern-day nation of Ukraine. Starting near the region of Smolensk in Russia, it flows through the nation of Belarus before completing its 1095 km path through Ukraine and finally reaching the Black Sea. The river has been a critical source of trade, transportation, energy, and irrigation for the Ukrainian state ever since its very inception.

The significance of the Dnipro was further increased after the second world war when the Soviet Union undertook several large-scale construction projects on the river, intent on creating reservoirs for power and irrigation purposes. One of these projects, the Kakhovka dam, created a 2155 square kilometres large reservoir in the southern part of the Dnipro, which allowed for the construction of a wide array of irrigation canals in the south of Ukraine and Crimea.

The largest and most ambitious of these irrigation canals was started in 1961, and ten years later, the majority of the North Crimean Canal (NCC) was completed. Stretching for 402km from the Kakhovka reservoir to the Kerch Strait, it transported 294 cubic meters per second from the canal head at the Dnipro to the dry and arid parts of the northern Crimean Peninsula.

Northern Crimea is originally an arid steppe landscape, only receiving about 300-400 mm of annual rainfall. This is in stark contrast to the southern regions where the Crimean Mountains trap humidity and increases yearly rainfall to around 1000mm a year. Historically, these mountains forced most of the population and agriculture to be centred in the south of the peninsula.

However, the completion of the NCC conquered this geographical problem, making it famous in the USSR, where it was showcased as a proud example of the Communist people dominating nature and shaping it to their will. The redirected waters of the Dnipro brought new life to the arid salty steppe. Allowing the population to reform the land, remove some of the natural salinity, and make parts of the north into arable land. The newly available land and potable water allowed for a massive influx of migrants, causing the population to double from ca.1 200 000 in 1959 to 2 400 000 in 1989.

This population growth was matched by an increase in agricultural land. At its height during the Soviet era, the amount of irrigated and cultivated land on the peninsula reached 400 000 hectares, with the NCC providing 72% of all the water needed for irrigation. However, this again changed in 2014 with the illegal military annexation of Crimea by Russian armed forces.

The Annexation

The Ukrainian forces stationed on the peninsula, many of them native Crimeans, were initially ordered not to open fire on the 'little green men' that started seizing control of the state buildings and other strategic areas in the region. There was widespread confusion over the true military nature of these 'little green men', and decision-makers in Kyiv did not want Ukrainian forces to open fire first in a potentially devastating conflict. Finally, the allegiance of the Ukrainian troops stationed on the peninsula was in question as many of them were either native to Crimea or had some level of Russian ethnicity. These issues compounded fears among Ukrainian decision-makers and restricted their actions, resulting in a meagre defence of the Ukrainian positions.

This lack of action would see the peninsula fall to Russian forces in a relatively bloodless occupation, with the heavy fighting of the conflict instead taking place in the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine. However, one action the Ukrainian forces undertook when retreating from Crimea was to create a temporary dam of sandbags on the NCC, located safely on the Ukrainian side of Perekop isthmus, thus blocking the flow of water to Crimea. Seven years later, this provisional dam has now become a fully reinforced concrete dam, with sluice gates redirecting the excess water from the Dnipro into the Black Sea. 

^ Maps Data: Google, @2021 CNES, Airbus, Maxar Technologies, Kartdata @2021.



^ Maps Data: Google, @2021, Maxar Technologies, Kartdata @2021.

The effects of this seven-year water blockade have been devastating on the nature, ecology, and people of Crimea. Yet, as neither side is eager to compromise, the dam remains Ukraine's chief leverage on the occupying forces. The best way to detail and comprehend the effects of this seven year water blockade is to use available satellite pictures combined with reports from both sides. 

Agriculture

As previously mentioned, the NCC was primarily an irrigation canal, and with its water, the maximum area of cultivated lands in Crimea reached 400 000 hectares during the Soviet Union. However, years of mismanagement and agricultural decline had caused this number to drop to about 120-130 000 hectares by 2013.

Still, this number greatly exceeds the amount of land cultivated after the Russian annexation and the subsequent closure of the NCC. In 2017 the provisional Agricultural Department of Crimea reported that only 14 000 hectares of land were actively cultivated.

They further reported that with increased subsidies from Russia, the amount of cultivated land could reach 59 000 hectares by 2020. Yet, excessive droughts and worsening conditions have meant that the amount of cultivated land has stagnated, and the amount of vegetation on the peninsula has decreased. The effects of the 2018-2020 droughts are so pronounced that they can be seen from space, with satellite imagery showing a reduction in vegetation and a worsening of the situation.

Some of the reasons for the decline in agricultural output cannot be blamed solely on Russia and its occupation. The NCC had already experienced years of neglect before the illegal annexation. The increase in available water created by the canal also led to water-intensive crops like rice and soybeans being preferred by farmers, even though the arid Crimean steppe was wholly unsuited for this type of cultivation. Still, these underlying problems were quickly exacerbated by the illegal annexation and subsequent shutting down of the NCC. 



^ Crimean Peninsula 2016. Maps Data: Google, @2016. 



^ Crimean Peninsula 2020. Maps Data: Google, @2020. 

Demographics

Another issue compounding the water situation in Crimea is the increase in population resulting from the Russian annexation. The true extent of the demographic change is hard to accurately measure as there are competing claims coming from the Ukrainian and Russian sources.

On their part, Ukraine claims that the local Ukrainian population and Crimean Tartars are being harassed and forced to vacate the region, bringing back memories of the forced relocation of Tartars under Catharina the Great and later Stalin during the USSR. There seems to be some truth to this claim, with about 140 000 pro-Ukrainian natives and Crimean Tartars having left Crimea since the 2014 annexation.

The leader of the Crimean Tartars, Mustafa Dzhemilev has been very vocal in his opposition to the occupation, accusing the Russian authorities of forcibly removing the Tartar population and replacing it with Russian citizens. Intentionally changing the demographic makeup of an occupied territory violates the Geneva Convention, Article 49, which details the legal framework of occupying forces. As a result, if true, it would constitute a severe breach of international law. However, as the leader of a displaced people, Mr Dzhemilev also has an incentive to portray the Russian occupation negatively.

Russia, on their part, has vehemently denied any claims of wrongdoing and rejected claims of targeting the ethnic Tartar population. Instead, Russian statistics indicate that only about 250 000 migrants have moved from Russia to the peninsula since 2014. In contrast, Dzhemilev claims that the actual number of migrants is closer to 850 000 or 1 000 000 people.

In the end, both statements remain highly disputed, and although the Russian statistics measure the number of civilians moving to Crimea, they do not detail the new military and defence personally being redeployed to the area. It is reasonable to assume that Russia has reinforced their position on the peninsula after the annexation, and this is supported by several new military bases being built after 2014.

Provisional numbers released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also indicate that the number of Russian military personnel has more than doubled from the roughly 12.5 thousand troops stationed on the island in 2014 to nearly 31.5 thousand soldiers in 2019. As these soldiers are likely to bring their families, ancillary staff, and support units with them, it is reasonable to assume that the number of people on the peninsula is expected to be somewhere between the Ukrainian and Russian estimates.

Still, to put things into perspective, the population of Crimea before the completion of the NCC was only about one and a half million people. The population was also primarily located along the region's mountainous southern part, where most of the precipitation is found. Today, that number is at least twice the pre-NCC number, with the population being spread all over the peninsula. Whether one chooses to believe the Russian or Ukrainian statistic, there seems to be a significant shortfall of water.

Water in Crimea

This shortfall is especially likely since the NCC accounted for nearly 11% of the water used for direct human consumption. The remaining potable water came from local wells, springs, rivers, and reservoirs. In theory at least, the local Crimean population should have ample access to drinkable water. This is supported with statistics from 2014, which showed that the Crimean Peninsula had 23 reservoirs, 15 of which rely on in-stream or local water sources and only 8 of which relied on off-stream water, in the form of the NCC. However, although relatively low, the 11% number listed for the NCC is also slightly misleading.

The 15 naturally occurring reservoirs are far more vulnerable to fluctuations in the local environment. In times of drought, several of the rivers, lakes and reservoirs on the peninsula dry up, and without the guaranteed supply of water from the NCC, the entire water supply is threatened. The prolonged drought since 2018 has been a devastating example of this as several water sources have dried up, including the largest off-stream reservoir, the Mizhhirne, and one of the largest rivers on the peninsula the Biyuk-Karasu.

To compensate for the lack of spring water and precipitation, Crimea relies increasingly on groundwater. But overreliance on local wells and groundwater is not a permanent solution, and it can have disastrous effects. The years of neglect suffered by the NCC before 2014 meant that vast amounts of the water were lost on the way to the farthest end of the canal. This "lost" water would seep into the ground due to the bad lining of the canal, refilling natural groundwater reserves and pushing the natural salinity down into the ground.

However, as the Crimean authorities have been relying more and more on wells since 2014, without the steady supply of water through the NCC, the level of groundwater in the local aquifers has dropped substantially and is now plagued by increasing salinity. As the Black Sea borders Crimea on all sides, empty aquifers are quickly threatened by encroaching saltwater, making water sources undrinkable in high enough doses. 



^ Mizhhirne reservoir 2014. Maps Data: Google, @2014.



^ Mizhhirne reservoir 2021. Maps Data: Google, @2021, Maxar Technologies, Kartdata @2021.

^ Mizhhirne reservoir 2021. Maps Data: Google, @2021, Maxar Technologies, Kartdata @2021.

Russia's Response

Russia has not remained oblivious to the increasing threat posed by water scarcity in the peninsula. Ever since the annexation in 2014, the Russian authorities have been trying many different solutions to mitigate the water shortage. These "solutions" include the redirection of local rivers, subsidising the drilling of new wells, rebuilding reservoirs, building desalination plants, and finally, ambitious water infrastructure projects linking Crimea to waterways in Russia.

Still, seven years since their occupation, the water situation has only grown worse. As noted earlier, with the overreliance on wells, the problem is that most "solutions" create new problems. For example, to alleviate some of the dry areas on the peninsula, the Russian authorities redirected the Biyuk-Karasu river. This river that starts in the Bilohirs'ke reservoir only managed to temporarily support these dry areas before drying up itself in the 2018 drought. Furthermore, the Bilohirs'ke reservoir that supports the river is itself in dire need of water, with reports indicating that water storage is low and slowly drying up. This is also confirmed in satellite imagery, which shows a clear line of newly dry land surrounding the reservoir.

The Bilohirs'ke reservoir is not the only one under extreme stress. In February 2020, the reservoirs feeding the Crimean capital of Simferopol were at only one-third capacity. This could only sustain the city for 90-100 days, and as a result strict water rationing was introduced. In 2019, Moscow announced the investment of 25 billion rubles or $390 million to build an intermountain reservoir close to the city in the hopes of avoiding future catastrophe. Still, this did little to alleviate the problem in 2020. In addition to this, the Russian authorities have announced a further $390 million to reconstruct the Mizhhirne reservoir. These are enormous amounts of money for a nation with the economic output of Russia, and Ukraine is aware of the staggering cost the water shortage is currently putting on the Russian treasury. In a world of finite resources, every ruble used on the Crimean water shortage is one less for the Russian armed forces. It is, therefore, in Ukraine's interest to maintain the current situation.

^ Bilohirs’ke reservoir 2021. Maps Data: Google, @2021, Maxar Technologies, Kartdata @2021.

Russia is also undertaking other ambitious and expensive infrastructure projects to secure water to Crimea. One such idea was to create a water pipeline in combination with the Kerch Strait Bridge connecting the Russian mainland and the river Don to Crimea. However, this plan was scrapped due to the extreme cost associated with the project and the fact that the Russian area of Krasnodar Krai adjacent to Crimea is also in dire need of water, and currently facing its own water shortage.  

Another ambitious plan is for the Russian authorities to build several desalination plants across the peninsula to harness the Black Sea's salty waters. In March 2020, the Russian authorities announced a plan to invest 3.5 billion rubles or $45 million into desalination facilities. Despite these investments, the amount of energy needed to effectively supply Crimea with desalinated seawater is far higher than what is currently available. This has led several experts to question the feasibility of using large scale desalination. Furthermore, as businesses in Crimea are subject to international sanctions after the illegal annexation, Russia would have to rely on its own expertise to build, maintain and run these facilities. Russia has historically been a nation with ample amounts of freshwater, and as a result, it has never needed to invest heavily in desalination facilities. Therefore, it is questionable if they have the technological knowledge, skills, and expertise to do this effectively.

Favouring Industry

Water insecurity on the peninsula is also increased by the effects of the regions chemical industry. Before the invasion in 2013, this industry only accounted for 12% of all water consumption. However, in 2015 this number had spiked to 50%. The chemical industry on the peninsula is vital to Russia. It is one of the biggest employers in Crimea, and the Crimean Titan chemical plant is owned by the Ukrainian Oligarch Dmytro Firtash, who is widely considered pro-Russian. As a result, Moscow needs to keep the plants operating. Still, even here, the drought has had adverse effects. In 2017 a chemical leak from the Crimean Titan facility caused an environmental disaster on the peninsula. Its cause was later identified as a lack of water to function as a protective layer covering sulphuric acid reservoirs.

International law

On the international stage, Russia has been attempting to levy legal action against Ukraine. They claim that the water blockade violates international humanitarian law and laws concerning transboundary water management. The irony of these claims is not lost on Ukrainian lawmakers in Kyiv, who have witnessed the illegal occupation and annexation of their own sovereign territory for seven years. Furthermore, as the NCC is an artificial canal and not an intrinsic part of the Dnipro, it is not covered by the previous bilateral agreements concerning the water management of this river. The humanitarian argument also falters as geological and hydrological surveys indicate that the groundwater and local springs should be enough to sustain the local population if appropriately managed.

Finally, the 1949 Geneva Convention puts the burden of providing necessities like food and water solely on the occupying nation, and Ukraine is therefore rejecting Russia's legal claims. In the end, the legal conflict boils down to whether the international community accepts Crimea as a part of Russian or as an occupied part of Ukraine. Currently, the vast majority of nations lean towards the latter.

Possible military intervention

Facing a legal deadlock, increasing water shortages, and rising costs connected to annexation, Moscow might consider military action. This is a threat that the Ukrainian military is firmly aware of, and as a result, any rise in troop movements and hostility is keenly observed. Russia's potential military intervention could either involve a full-scale military occupation of southern Ukraine and the lower Dnipro or a smaller tactical strike aimed at the dam blocking the NCC. The motive for military action is supported by some analysts who claim that the original plan for the 2014 invasion was to conquer the Southern regions of Ukraine, Crimea, and Donbas. If valid, this means Russia might attempt a new invasion to correct the mistakes of 2014. Finally, at the time of writing, there are reports of Russia massing military forces on the border to Ukraine, which again might hint at military action.  

However, the likelihood of a full-scale military invasion remains low. Russian forces are still deployed in Syria, and a military invasion of Southern Ukraine would be very risky and costly. Such an operation would require a large amount of manpower and the deployment of heavy equipment. Furthermore, such an attack would also incur new sanctions from the West and risk a potential military response by NATO. Instead, the most likely military scenario remains a dedicated strike against the dam on the NCC or an increase in cyber/ proxy attacks against Ukrainian targets.

Conclusion



The water situation in Crimea remains dire, and as with all conflict, the losers will be the civilian population. Without any significant developments in the conservation, use and storage of water, Crimea looks set to return to its pre-1950s environment, with an arid salty steppe in the north and a small population centred around the southern mountains. Some of the ecological damage currently taking place can be reversed with enough time, money, and water. Still, it took ten years before the salinity in the Northern steppe was low enough for cultivation after the construction of the NCC. With neither side willing to compromise, an ecological disaster in Crimea seems almost inevitable.