Iran’s nuclear ambitions are often seen as a form of Gordian knot. Whoever manages to untie it will have greater sway in the Middle East, and if dealt with correctly, it can bring some semblance of stability to the otherwise anarchic region. This view, although enticing and simplistic, is likely as mythical as the knot itself. 

Views on the Iran Nuclear deal largely fall within two camps. In Washington, the Foreign policy hawks advocate a policy of ‘maximum pressure’, much akin to Alexander slicing the Gordian knot in two according to some retellings of the story. This approach often includes heavy sanctions and other measures, pursued Multilaterally or Unilaterally if necessary, all aimed at removing the economic and political will in Tehran to pursue a nuclear program.

On the other hand, the doves favour diplomatic engagement with Iran through the U.N and groups such as the P5 + 1 (Five permanent members of the U.N Security Council and Germany). This approach aims to avoid Iranian nuclear proliferation through the lifting of sanctions and the normalisation of ties in other areas. Thus, hoping to detangle the situation through diplomacy and compromise.

Whereas Trump’s presidency in large parts can be categorised by the former, Biden looks set to return to the more dove like approach of the Obama administration. This includes making campaign promises to re-enter the deal with Iran upon entering the Oval Office and making overtures towards the original European signatories of the agreement for a Multilateral approach.

Both parties claim that the other side weakens U.S interests in the region and both accuse the other of increasing tensions and enabling the clerical regime in Teheran to inch closer to a nuclear weapon. The only thing the two sides seem to agree upon is the importance of the deal itself.

What is in the deal?

The deal that was signed in 2015 and entered into force in 2016 contained several restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program. Among these were the pledges from Iran to reduce its number of centrifuges by two thirds, limit the amount of stored uranium to 300kg and to limit the enrichment of said uranium to 3.67%, far below the 20% needed to power nuclear naval vessels and the 90% required for a nuclear bomb. These conditions were to be ensured by the constant monitoring and inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The JCPOA also came with several U.N approved annexes that included short-term restrictions on Iran’s build-up of ballistic missile capabilities.

In return for these concessions, the P5 + 1 nations agreed to lift sanctions, arms embargoes and unfreeze funds in return for continued compliance with the agreement. These benefits were staggered, with some such as the unfreezing of some Iranian assets abroad in 2016, and others such as the U.N. restriction on conventional arms sales to Iran being lifted in October 2020. In addition to these, there are further steps in the agreement known as ‘Sunset clauses’ that slowly allow Iran access to the international market and to build up military and nuclear potential.

The Criticism

These ‘Sunset clauses’ are some of the most controversial points of the agreement. The critics claim the agreement only delays the inevitable while allowing Iran the time and resources to build up substantial military potential through increased revenue from international trade.

There is some merit to this criticism. Research by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) found a direct correlation between a lower Iranian defence budget and international sanctions.

They found that Iranian defence spending decreased after the Trump administration left the JCPOA in May 2018 and reimposed severe sanctions. Iranian defence spending increased by 30% between 2016 and 2018 and fell in 2019. A similar decline also occurred after 2011 when the U.S and its allies enforced sanctions on Iran, limiting oil revenue and forcing the economy into a recession.

The critics of the JCPOA argue that this financial pressure hinders Teheran from supporting its regional proxy groups and forces the regime to rethink its foreign policy, hopefully bringing them to the table for new negotiations. However, this approach is not devoid of problems.

Iranian defence spending increased in 2020 despite heavy sanctions from the U.S. Furthermore, despite the sanctions and some vague invitations made by the Trump administration, Teheran has not chosen to re-negotiate the deal. Instead, the regime has taken an increasingly hostile stance, and events such as missile attacks on U.S installations in Iraq have increased since 2018.

The problems with sanctions

Several problems complicate sanctioning the regime in Teheran. First and foremost is that the Iranian economy is relatively resilient towards sanctions after decades of on and off-again isolation from international markets. This has allowed the regime to assume increased control in all sectors of the economy, helping to shore up certain industries, and buttressing it against international sanctions.  This means that although sanctions do have a serious effect on the Iranian economy, it is not the deathblow that some proponents seem to think it is.

Furthermore, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Iranian military's political wing, owns and operates several companies that generate profits directly for the Iranian Republic. Many of these companies are also involved in illicit trading with foreign companies outside of Iran, thus adding unknown amounts of money to the defence budget and shielding the IRGC from some of the fallout from international sanctions.

Another issue with sanctions is that they disproportionality affect the Iranian public and not the elites in charge of the government. The hope is that economic turbulence can create political pressure within Iran and either force the government to succumb to international pressure or face internal instability. Advocates of heavy sanctions point to protests within Iran as a sign that this strategy is working. Despite this, the Iranian regime has proven remarkably resilient to outside pressure.

Much of this is due to the inherent political foundation of the regime itself. As many analysts have pointed out, revolutionary regimes forged in war quickly become masters at manipulating the civilian population and quelling internal instability. Instead of undermining the regime, the U.S sanctions give Teheran a handy scapegoat to blame for low economic growth and a narrative to fuel their national propaganda.

Finally, unilateral sanctions by the U.S complicates interaction with European allies and other regional players that do not choose to sanction Iran. This means that U.S unilateral sanctions invariably negatively affect the trade of certain allies, which can complicate international relations.

Biden’s Plan

These problems are not lost on the incoming Biden administration. During the campaign trail, Biden promised to re-enter the JCPOA. He has also publicly decried Trump’s policy as dangerous, even stating that: ‘the last goddamn thing we need in that region is a build-up of nuclear capability’.

Instead of Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’, Biden wants to offer Iran a: ‘credible path back to diplomacy’ as long as Teheran comes back into compliance with the JCPOA. Biden’s desire to re-join the JCPOA is also evident in his choice for Secretary of State, Anthony Blinken, who has long supported the JCPOA. 

Biden’s desire to re-join the JCPOA stems partly from his wish to re-establish a key part of Obama’s foreign policy towards the Middle East and his willingness to increase Iran’s ‘Breakout time’, the time perceived to be necessary to create a nuclear bomb. An easy way to do this is to ensure that Iran maintains a low level of uranium and a low level of enrichment, two key areas that are limited by the JCPOA. Biden is also hopeful that other deals can be made on Iran’s regional ambitions and its ballistic missile defence after both parties return to the original agreement.

The Knots in Biden’s plan:

Although Biden’s plan sounds good on paper, there are several problems with its underlying assumptions. The most critical flaw is not recognising that the strategic and political scene in the Middle East has changed a lot since the JCPOA was initially proposed in 2015.

Inside Iran the ‘moderates’ that agreed to the original deal is under increased political pressure by Iranian ‘hard-liners’ to take a more rigid stance against the U.S. This is in part due to the assassination of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani by the U.S in January 2020 and the targeted killing of lead Iranian Nuclear Scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November by an unknown actor. These two events have created a lot of animosity within Iran, with the Iranian parliament having vowed revenge and created laws calling for higher uranium enrichment.

This increased hostility has also caused many analysts to predict a win for the more conservative faction in the forthcoming Iranian presidential election in June 2021. Even if the ‘moderates’ manage to maintain the office, President Hassan Rouhani will not be eligible to run for a third term. This means that unless Biden manages to negotiate a new deal or re-enter the old one by June 2021, he will have to deal with a new set of negotiators in Teheran.

Further complicating the already complex situation is that Iran has been enriching and stockpiling far more uranium than initially allowed in the JCPOA. This includes enriching uranium up to 20%, and stockpiling more than 12 times the allowed limit of uranium. Some have seen the increase in illegal uranium as a way for Iran to gain a greater bargaining position in the upcoming talks, and they will present Biden with severe problems as crossing the 20% enrichment mark was considered a red line in the original treaty. Even if Biden manages to navigate these issues and re-negotiates the JCPOA, there remains little proof that he will be able to curb Iran’s regional ambitions or its ballistic missile program.

These two areas have seen increased funding and activity ever since the first signing of the JCPOA. Furthermore, as Iran considers its ballistic missile program to be for legitimate defence purposes, it refuses to subject it to international monitoring and control. With both these areas seeing increased funding during the reign of what some western commentators deem a ‘moderate’/ ‘progressive’ president in Rouhani there remains little proof that this will change with a new Iranian government.

The Changing Landscape:

Dwarfing the changes within Iran is the geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Since 2015 Iran has been able to expand and consolidate its political network in the Middle East. It has increased its support for Hezbollah with the increased revenue from the JCPOA, funding its operations in both Lebanon and Syria. Iran has further aided Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to regain control over most of Syria and overseen the expansion of Shia Militias in Iraq to help defeat ISIS. Other Iranian proxies like the Houthis in Yemen have also seen an increase in Iranian support. This has enabled Iran to establish a corridor of soft power stretching from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean and threaten Saudi Arabia from two fronts.

This gets to the critical problem with the entire Iran nuclear deal. Iran knows that it does not need ballistic missiles, massive conventional forces, or nuclear weapons to expand its regional power. It has been doing very well without them for the last five years and will likely continue to expand its regional influence using its network of proxies. Teheran does not need an actual nuclear device. Instead, it can use the fear of nuclear weapons to gain advantageous deals with the West, ramping up its nuclear pressure whenever it needs to gain more bargaining power.

This is the main problem with any return to the JCPOA. It allows Iran to use a limited foreign policy priority to levy massive benefits for the programs that deliver their real foreign policy objectives. Therefore, it is doubtful that Biden will negotiate any further compromises from Iran. Especially when it comes to limiting its regional ambitions, and the other nations in the Middle East know this.

This is partly why Saudi Arabia has initiated its own nuclear enrichment program with the help of a Chinese company, and why Israel and several Gulf nations are attempting to normalise relations. It is hard to imagine the JCPOA being re-negotiated or solving the general tensions surrounding Iran’s regional ambitions. Instead, any potential deal must incorporate some aspects of Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ plan as well to offset Iran’s gains.

If the Biden administration tries to untangle the Gordian knot of Iran with a simple return to the original treaty, they will soon realise that it is easy to get entangled in the many interconnected ropes that make up the Middle East's changing geopolitics. At that point just like Alexander before them it is handy to have a sharp sword or even better a scalpel at the ready.