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Ethiopia Crisis: Federal Forces Close in on Tigrayan Capital
Alexander Gale
21 November 2020
Ethiopia's prime minster says, 'the final critical act of law enforcement will be done in the coming days', but it is unclear whether the federal offensive will mark the end of the crisis in Tigray or the beginning of a protracted civil war.
Map detailing the latest developments in the Tigray crisis. Federal forces are believed to have captured the towns of Axum, Shire, Humera and Alamata.
The Fighting Intensifies
Following the first round of fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region which began in early November, the Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed issued the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) an ultimatum: surrender within three days. That deadline passed on Thursday 17 November.
The crisis in Tigray has pitted Ethiopia’s central government against the TPLF. The two sides have been feuding since November last year when the TPLF declined to join Abiy’s new Prosperity Party, which emerged from the previous EPRDF coalition government.
Animosity between the central government and the TPLF was worsened in September 2020 when the TPLF held unsanctioned regional elections in Tigray. The government had previously postponed all elections due to COVID-19 but the TPLF alleged that this was a pretext to unlawfully extend Abiy’s mandate beyond its legitimate term. By the end of the following month, the central government and the TPLF had virtually broken all ties.
Open hostilities erupted in early November. The government reacted to an attack on its Northern Command base by launching airstrikes against TPLF targets in Tigray. Since then, federal forces have also advanced on the ground.
The offensive by federal forces appears to have made significant progress. According to the government, federal forces have taken the towns of Humera, Shire, Axum and Alamata. Humera is strategically important because of its airport, whereas Alamata is a mere 120km or so south of the Tigrayan capital Mekelle. From these positions, federal forces’ next move is likely be a two-front offensive from the south and northwest against the Tigrayan capital. Mekelle has already reportedly been targeted by government airstrikes.
The TPLF have vowed to fight on. The Tigrayan leader, Debretsion Gebremichael said that forces loyal to the TPLF had wreaked ‘heavy defeats on all fronts against the forces that came to attack us.’
The TPLF have also accused neighbouring Eritrea of sending troops into Tigray and supporting the government’s military offensive. On Saturday 14 November, the TPLF launched three rockets at the airport in Asmara, Eritrea’s capital. The strike was intended to slow down federal forces, who have allegedly been launching operations against Tigray from within Eritrea.
Facts on the ground are hard to establish. Leaders on both sides have claimed that their forces are performing well, but little is known of actual casualties, morale, or the positioning of troops.
Federal forces seem to have quickly gained ground, but it remains to be seen whether their progress towards Mekelle is halted by defending forces. Even if they do reach Mekelle, the nuances of urban warfare will pose a significant challenge. A well organised and deeply-entrenched Tigrayan defence may yet repel federal forces. Without concrete intelligence, it is hard to accurately project an outcome.
Will the Crisis Become a Civil War?
Ethiopian politics are increasingly defined by the tensions between ethno-nationalists and ethno-federalists versus pan-Ethiopianists. Abiy’s government seeks to promote greater national unity, but this has stoked fears that the prime minister is seeking to further centralise authority and limit regional autonomy.
Ethiopia’s system of governance is based on ethnic federalism. More than 80 ethnic groups live across Ethiopia’s nine ethnically-based National Regional States. Each state enjoys significant autonomy from the central government. The country’s ethno-federalists are committed to preserving the present federal arrangements, whereas the ethno-nationalists desire further regional autonomy. Both camps are suspicious of Abiy’s pan-Ethiopian sentiments.
The rebellion in Tigray is a very real risk to Ethiopian cohesion and could lead to the balkanisation of the country. The central government needs a quick and decisive victory in Tigray to avoid being seen as weak. Left unchecked, a rising in Tigray could lead to rebellions elsewhere, thus splitting Ethiopia between competing ethno-nationalist groups.
A Brewing Humanitarian Crisis
The fighting has already taken its toll on Tigray’s civilian population. Approximately 27,000 refugees have reportedly fled from Tigray to Sudan. Most of them have arrived at the town of Hamdayet, a Sudanese border town. Hamdayet is already inundated with over 12,000 refugees
and is well beyond its capacity to cater for such large numbers.
Conventional fighting between federal forces and the TPLF already poses a significant risk to civilians which is further compounded by pockets of inter-communal violence. Amnesty International has confirmed reports of a massacre
that took place on 9 November in the western Tigrayan town of Mai-Kadra. Hundreds were killed in close quarters with machetes and other improvised melee weapons.
A witness who spoke to Amnesty International
said: ‘Those wounded told me they were attacked with machetes, axes and knives. You can also tell from the wounds that those who died were attacked by sharp objects. It is horrible and I am really sad that I witnessed this in my life’
The government have blamed the TPLF for the massacre, but this has not been verified. According to state-run media most of the victims were of non-Tigrayan backgrounds.
For as long as the crisis continues, the humanitarian situation is only likely to get worst. Refugees and internally displaced people fleeing from battles and intercommunal violence may find it increasingly hard to meet their basic needs if humanitarian organisations cannot access the areas most affected.
Regional Destabilisation
A protracted conflict within Ethiopia threatens to destabilise the Horn of Africa and would almost certainly draw in other actors.
Eritrea already have an interest in seeing the TPLF defeated following Saturday’s rocket strike on the capital Asmara. Bad blood between the TPLF and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki predate the ongoing hostilities. Border disputes between Tigray and Eritrea were a leading cause in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War which began in the late 1990s.
Although Tigrayan claims that Eritrean troops are operating in Tigray and that Asmara’s airport is being used by federal forces have not been verified, it is not beyond the realms of possibility. Eritrea may see the current crisis as a chance to secure its southern border and neutralise an old rival. If the Eritreans are not directly involved in the crisis now, they almost certainly will be if the conflict becomes protracted.
Ethiopian forces play a significant role in African Union (AU) security operations in the wider region. The crisis in Tigray could have knock-on effects for neighbouring Somalia, where Ethiopian troops are heavily involved in counter-terrorism operations against Islamist groups like Al-Shabaab.
Reports have already emerged this week that Ethiopian peacekeepers in Somalia have disarmed 200-300 of their Tigrayan colleagues. A further reduction of effective manpower has been caused by the need to redeploy troops to the Tigrayan theatre to combat the TPLF. If Ethiopian troops are not substituted by another state’s forces, this may present an opportunity for insurgent and terrorist groups to further destabilise an already fragile Somalia.
Egypt and Sudan may find some benefit in the current crisis, as efforts to construct the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) will likely be disrupted by the crisis. Both countries have strongly objected to the dam’s construction according to economic and security-based arguments. Egypt and Sudan even considered taking military action against Ethiopia
to stop the construction of the dam in 2010. However, the seemingly imminent refugee crisis caused by the fighting will give the Sudanese leadership enough of a headache to detract from any gains they might have made in the agonisingly slow GERD negotiations
Could There be a Peace Settlement?
Peace is not likely because both sides have too much to lose. If the central government does not gain a decisive victory, federal authority may be tested elsewhere in the country. On the other hand, if the TPLF is defeated, its leaders will be imprisoned or exiled, and Tigray may lose some of its regional autonomy granted by the federal system.
No one wants a repeat of the Ethiopian Civil War which lasted between 1974 and 1991, but if the Tigrayan crisis becomes a protracted conflict, Ethiopia could become the next Syria or Libya. If the security situation is further destabilised, Ethiopia could be carved up between competing ethnic groups. It would not take long for a fully fledged civil war to drag in neighbouring actors and before long great powers further afield may sense an opportunity to expand their influence and power.
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