Counter-Messaging Initiatives: The Role of US Diplomatic Institutions in Combating Pro-Kremlin Disinformation on Twitter

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Maximiliana Wynne

28 September 2022

Social media has become a hotly contested space for information warfare. If state actors intend to seize the narrative, they must adopt appropriate strategies for countering misinformation.

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‘In an information age, communications strategies become more important and outcomes are

shaped not merely by whose army wins, but also by whose story wins’ (Nye, 2013: 6).

Introduction

The notion of bending the truth or falsifying information for political or financial gain is

far from novel. The only differences between historical propaganda and modern propaganda are

the digital tools used to disseminate them. Various studies reveal how Russian state-affiliated

institutions use social media to facilitate the expeditious spread of large-scale public manipulation

by disseminating disinformation that amplifies misleading narratives (Helmus et al., 2018,

Polyakova 2019, Elswah & Howard 2020, GEC 2020). Fortunately, there exists diverse literature

on the practice and optimization of digital diplomacy to counter disinformation on social media

(Vilmer et al., 2018, Bjola & Papadakis 2020, Hedling 2021). This paper attempts to address one

of the greatest challenges facing US foreign policy in the 21st-century: how can the US

government’s diplomatic institutions craft a sophisticated counter disinformation strategy to

combat the renascent threat of state-sponsored disinformation.

This paper strictly focuses on countering state-sponsored disinformation (CSD) efforts that

fall under the umbrella of public diplomacy. First and foremost, this study briefly reviews the link

between pro-Kremlin disinformation and diplomatic communication in the digital age to identify

areas of contention and how they can be addressed. After a preliminary typology of recent US

public diplomacy efforts aimed at CSD, an analysis of these efforts will identify an area in which

CSD efforts are lacking. It is argued that digital diplomacy is an overlooked and underutilized

resource for countering and neutralizing state-sponsored disinformation. Through a case study

approach, this paper examines a counter-messaging Twitter initiative that attempted to challenge

a pro-Kremlin historical revisionism disinformation campaign. The analysis that follows

investigates how subsequent counter-messaging hashtag campaigns can help diplomats neutralize

disinformation on Twitter. The primary conclusion is that diplomatic institutions should harness

the power of digital diplomacy to offset and rectify disinformation alongside traditional proactive

measures.

Pro-Kremlin Disinformation and Diplomatic Communication in the Digital Age

Since the Cold War, Putin’s Russia has reinvigorated its subversion campaigns to

accommodate the 21st-century technological landscape. Information operations and social media

are the bread and butter of Russia’s foreign policy. The Kremlin conducts various sophisticated

disinformation campaigns to erode trust in Western and democratic institutions (Helmus et al.,

2018). Disinformation is a contested term. It is commonly defined as ‘false information that is

knowingly disseminated with malicious intent’ (Lim, 2019: 5). However, disinformation does not

always consist of false information; it can entail true facts designed to depict a manipulated view

of reality (Nemr & Gangware, 2019: 4).

Russia uses social media to spread disinformation, divert criticism away from important issues, intensify polarization, and suppress participation (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019). The ultimate goal of disinformation is to achieve policy paralysis (Svárovský et al., 2019: 5). Highranking Russian officials are increasingly using sharp power as a policy tool to control a narrative that makes the West look bad and Russia look better by comparison (Halliday, 2014). At first glance, sharp power can resemble soft power through public diplomacy engagement. However, unlike soft power, sharp power is aimed at manipulating target audiences by perforating the information they receive (Walker & Ludwig, 2017).

Digital disinformation is a crucial dimension of authoritarian sharp power, which uses a

distorted version of public and digital diplomacy to undermine liberal democracies’ existing soft

power (Hedling, 2021). The connection between pro-Kremlin disinformation and diplomatic

communication lies in the latter’s ability to use public and digital diplomacy to cultivate societal

resilience to the former (Bjola & Pamment, 2019: 102-16). From this perspective, societal

resilience is the capacity for communities to cope and adapt to disinformation (Cross & La Porte,

2016: 5). Official wide-ranging modifications to public diplomacy’s role in CSD began in 2016

with the US Countering Foreign Propaganda and Disinformation Act, which was then integrated

into the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. Since then, the US government’s public

diplomacy community has allocated substantial resources to CSD (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 4). The

following section will identify the most recent and prominent US public diplomacy CSD efforts.

The Department of State’s Public Diplomacy CSD Initiatives

The resurgent threat posed by state-sponsored disinformation has challenged diplomatic

efforts. In response, a wide range of State Department practices incorporates public diplomacy to

mitigate the potency of targeted disinformation. The Department of State’s Public Diplomacy and

Public Affairs Bureau comprises six offices, only two of which actively counter the threat of

malign foreign influence. The Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA) is

responsible for creating and implementing educational, professional, and cultural exchange

programs that advance American leadership and promote US foreign policy objectives (ECA

Functional Bureau Strategy, 2018: 3). The ECA has incorporated CSD programs that present

alternatives to extremism through international exchange programs that encourage critical thinking

and develop media literacy and journalism skills (ECA Functional Bureau Strategy, 2018: 9).

In 2016, the Global Engagement Center (GEC) became the dominant entity for countering

state-sponsored disinformation. Its primary objective is to identify, understand, expose, and

counter disinformation that intends to undermine or influence the US and its allies’ policies,

security, or stability (US Department of State GEC, 2021). The GEC’s Analytics and Research

Team ensures that the GEC has access to threat-based analytics and analysis of global public

opinion (Hearing, 2020: 14). The Center’s Technology Engagement Team facilitates the use of the

GEC’s technological efforts by hosting Tech Demos and Challenges that address difficulties in

assessing, understanding, and implementing technology-based solutions to combating

disinformation (Hearing, 2020: 14). The GEC’s Russia Team focuses on opposing and degrading

Russian disinformation through the leadership of policy, programmatic, and analytic efforts across

US Government agencies and with partner nations (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 18). The team works

closely with the State Department’s Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs (EUR), the Department of Defense’s (DOD) European Command, and partner nations to identify weaknesses

and harmonize deconflict programs (US ACPD Annual Report, 2019: 131).

Abroad, State Department-organized programs to CSD seek to build resilience to

disinformation by funding media literacy training that incorporates fact-checking and awareness

into public school curriculum; training local journalists and students in investigative reporting to

improve credibility and counter extremist narratives; sponsoring conferences, workshops, and

exchange programs that promote awareness of disinformation and its objectives; conducting

seminars on electoral interference and open source intelligence training; funding regional reporting

tours with disinformation and hybrid influence experts for journalists (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 39-

43).

Abroad, State Department-organized programs to CSD seek to build resilience to

disinformation by funding media literacy training that incorporates fact-checking and awareness

into public school curriculum; training local journalists and students in investigative reporting to

improve credibility and counter extremist narratives; sponsoring conferences, workshops, and

exchange programs that promote awareness of disinformation and its objectives; conducting

seminars on electoral interference and open source intelligence training; funding regional reporting

tours with disinformation and hybrid influence experts for journalists (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 39-

43).

Data and Methods

This case study combines quantitative and qualitative analysis of Twitter data to offer

insights into the social and political dynamics of deploying counter-messaging campaigns to

combat pro-Kremlin disinformation. The purpose of this review is to provide a comprehensive

understanding of how diplomatic institutions can combat disinformation on Twitter. The data

analyzes five different diplomatic Twitter accounts (Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the

Polish Embassy in the US, the US Embassy in Poland, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and

the Russian Embassy in the US) within an eight-month timeframe (September 1, 2019, to April

30, 2020). The tweets were collected from Twitter directly using the platform’s advanced search

setting. Tweets analyzed include those referencing the Kremlin’s historical revisionism of WWII

and tweets that used the hashtags #WWII, #80WW2, and #TruthAboutWWII.

The data set yielded a total of 157 tweets, all of which were in English. This study uses

content analysis to compare and contrast Western diplomatic institutions’ use of countermessaging campaigns after their adversarial counterparts initiated disinformation campaigns. The

study also compares engagement metrics (likes, comments, retweets) of Russia’s disinformation

campaign with the US and Poland’s counter-messaging campaign to assess the reach and

performance of such initiatives. To measure performance, this study compared the engagement

rate of each digital initiative to determine which campaign performed better and which was more

influential among its followers. By examining the official Twitter feeds of five diplomatic

institutions, this paper seeks to develop a framework that other democratic institutions can adopt

to combat the spread of state-sponsored disinformation on Twitter.

This paper’s findings are limited to one case study from Twitter content related to the

Kremlin’s historical revisionism of WWII. Future research could analyze several countermessaging campaigns to determine how such initiatives can be applied effectively. Additional

research could also examine comments to offer insight into what extent counter-messaging

campaigns shape the attitudes of Twitter users. The following case study does not discount the

tremendous role Russia played in WWII that led to victory in Europe against fascism. The case

study merely exemplifies the ways in which embassies and MFA’s can strategically use digital

diplomacy to CSD on Twitter by managing misconceptions and offering alternative viewpoints.

Given that this paper focuses on diplomatic counter-messaging initiatives, it does not

examine the breadth of Twitter content pertaining to the Kremlin’s historical revisionism

disinformation campaign. Instead, this paper intends to offer a framework that other diplomatic

institutions can adopt. Although the US was not the prime target of this particular disinformation

campaign, as a world superpower, it is fundamental that US embassies recognize it as such when

their host countries are the scapegoats.

The Kremlin’s Historical Revisionism Disinformation Campaign

The Kremlin’s historical revisionism disinformation campaign began after President Putin

did not receive an invitation to gather with world leaders in Poland to commemorate 80 years since

the outbreak of World War II. Poland did not invite Russia because of its hostile actions in Ukraine

(VOA, 2019). Putin responded by orchestrating a vengeful attempt at historical revisionism with

Poland as its target (Gaida et al., 2019). Putin attempts to portray Russia’s position in WWII as

peaceful and accuses the West of its own endeavor to re-interpret the war (Putin, 2020). Russia’s

attempt to re-write the pages of history quickly became the focus of pro-Kremlin disinformation. Three narratives in particular dominated cyberspace: ‘Poland is the organizer of WWII, the Soviet

Union saved Poland from ruin, US ordered the start of WWII’ (EUvDisInfo, 2019).

To endorse the Kremlin’s narrative, the official Twitter accounts of Russia’s MFA

(@mfa_russia) and the Russian Embassy in the US (@RusEmbUSA), among others, established

a rigorous disinformation campaign using the hashtags #TruthAboutWWII. While few tweets

containing the hashtag included false information, a vast majority of them were used to depict a

skewed version of history that condemned Poland and accused the US and EU of ‘distorting

history’ (MFA Russia, 2020).6 To counter the misleading claims, the official Twitter accounts of

Poland’s MFA (@PolandMFA), the US Embassy in Poland (@USEmbassyWarsaw), and the

Polish Embassy in the US (@PolishEmbassyUS) deployed a counter-messaging campaign using

the hashtag #80WW2. Neither the US State Department nor the US Embassy in Moscow

participated in the Twitter campaign.

#80WW2

This case study’s findings build on Bjola’s five counter-disinformation tactics for

diplomats.7 @USEmbassyWarsaw only tweeted using the #80WW2 campaign three times, all of

which highlighted former Vice President Pence’s visit to Poland for the 80th anniversary of WWII.

Bjola refers to this kind of CSD tactic as ‘ignoring.’ Diplomats ignore disinformation to prevent escalation (Bjola, 2019). While it is understandable for diplomats to ignore targeted disinformation, this tactic allows fallacious statements to go undisputed. Given that @USEmbassyWarsaw has a high engagement rate, it should be practicing digital diplomacy to disseminate positive western narratives to counter misleading ones.

Engagement Rate of Twitter Campaigns

This chart provides the average engagement rate of each hashtag campaign

^ Graph by author.

In contrast, @PolishEmbassyUS deployed the hashtag seven times and amassed a relatively low engagement rate compared to @USEmbassyWarsaw.

Percentage of Tweets Using Designated Campaign Hashtag

This chart shows the differences in tweet frequency by account between September 1, 2019, and March 31, 2020.

^ Chart by author

The Polish Embassy used the #80WW2 campaign to discredit Russian officials for attempting to rewrite WWII history. Bjola refers to this tactic as ‘discrediting,’ which seeks to undermine the messenger’s credibility (Bjola, 2019). However, given skepticism of Western propaganda in Russia and surrounding regions, such measures may motivate pro-Russia actors to adopt more aggressive disinformation strategies (Helmus et al., 2018: 71-73).

Polish Embassy in the US (2019) [Twitter]

@PolandMFA’s used the #80WW2 campaign to recount the history of Poland during WWII. Through 47 tweets over 18 days, @PolandMFA’s covered the near entirety of WWII from 13 major battles to individual stories of victims, paid homage to underground units, and resistance organizations, recognized the role of Polish radio stations during the conflict, and reviewed the post-war order. Unlike Russia’s disinformation campaign that criticized and accused Poland of falsehoods, the Polish campaign was objective and made sure to recognize the Soviet’s pivotal role in helping the Polish Army. Bjola claims that presenting facts accompanied by visuals to offer an alternative narrative rather than simply refuting misleading claims can help counter disinformation more effectively (Bjola, 2019).

Despite Poland’s effective counter-messaging strategy reviewed above, Bjola does not recognize @PolandMFA’s use of the campaign as one of the five CSD tactics. Perhaps @PolandMFA’s digital strategy could be referred to as ‘Neutralizing’ through the way it uses digital diplomacy to offset narratives designed to depict a manipulated view of reality. The way in which @PolandMFA used the campaign and Twitter as a storytelling medium to provide an alternative narrative to Russia’s account was well-received among its followers.

Twitter Campaign Engagement Metrics

This table demonstrates relevant metrics regarding each Twitter account’s hashtag campaigns.

^ Table by author.

Its campaign provided its followers with a focused narrative that shared facts via compelling visuals and recognized the value of Western allies. Additionally, the data reveals that @PolandMFA’s campaign generated an average of 57% more engagement per post than 14 @RusEmbUSA’s campaign. Retweets are telling of follower-receptivity and help amplify particular messages by transferring them to a different audience. In the future, embassies can use @PolandMFA’s counter-messaging campaign as a framework to neutralize the threat of disinformation.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland (2019) [Twitter]

This case study is important because it illustrates how Putin’s stab at historical revisionism indicates his willingness to alter past narratives to shape future foreign policy (Bankauskaitė, 2020: 1). These disinformation campaigns target younger generations with little to no memory of WWII who are more vulnerable to manipulation. Lea Gabrielle, Special Envoy and Coordinator of the GEC, reiterated the international necessity to communicate truthful narratives about WWII, and counter Russia’s historical revisionism (US Department of State, Gabrielle Testimony 2020). With the ebbing of those who lived through WWII, the story runs the risk of not being remembered or told factually, which is why it is crucial to carry out counter-messaging campaigns like #80WW2. Doing so preserves an authentic and accurate recollection of history for those who may not be familiar with WWII or understand how it relates to the EU-US bilateral relationship today.

Discussion

This case study demonstrates that diplomatic institutions can implement more effective measures to counter pro-Kremlin disinformation on social media. The challenge of weaponizing information is that governments who fail to set the message straight in cyberspace risk allowing misleading narratives to go unchallenged and therefore leading to mass acceptance of a threatening alternative. Thus, the goal of digital diplomacy in CSD is to ensure the robustness of optionality in the digital public sphere (Powers & Kounalakis, 2017: 30). However, not every disinformation campaign requires a public diplomacy response. In some cases, countering disinformation can backfire and may amplify a disinformation campaign (Subcommittee Hearing, 2020: 44). Skeptics argue that there is a lack of evidence suggesting pro-Kremlin disinformation’s ability to sway public opinion (Nemr & Gangware, 2019: 18).

Disinformation is not solely a domestic threat; it is a global one that demands cooperation. To counter disinformation, states must collaborate with allies who have shared values and understandings of the threat (Jean-Baptiste, 2021: 9). On one hand, behavioral analysts argue that the best way to counter pro-Kremlin disinformation is by crafting clear, compelling, and consistent digital narratives that offer a Western perspective to tell the EU, US, and NATO message to a broader audience (Helmus et al., 2018: 88-90). On the other hand, policymakers deem proactive approaches to CSD, such as media literacy training and advocacy, more effective in cultivating long-term societal resistance to disinformation (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 6).

While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to CSD, it is widely recognized among experts and senior public diplomacy officials that in an increasingly digital world, person-to-person interactions, such as conferences and educational programs, are not enough to counter a threat that is digital in nature. Future diplomatic efforts should prioritize and incorporate digital proficiency (Walker & Walsh, 2020: 37). Although it appears as if one country’s information campaign is another country’s disinformation operation, it all boils down to intent. Digital tools present a dualuse provocation. As observed in the case study, digital diplomacy can be used to communicate truthful information via soft power approaches just as easily as it can be used to disseminate disinformation or misinformation through sharp power strategies.

Conclusion

While research into disinformation has received a great deal of attention, there is still much to learn in terms of crafting a sophisticated counter-strategy. This paper considers the role that US diplomatic institutions play to help combat pro-Kremlin disinformation on Twitter. It revealed how diplomatic institutions should master the art of digital diplomacy to offset and rectify disinformation in addition to traditional proactive measures. For other Western states facing similar threats to democracy, this analysis can serve as a model for how diplomatic institutions use counter-messaging campaigns on social media to promote and safeguard their image from targeted disinformation. In sum, ideological information wars cannot be won by sanctions or military deterrence alone. Effective solutions must involve investments in soft power strategies such as skillful public diplomacy and its digital counterpart. In the future, US diplomatic countermessaging efforts should coordinate with the intelligence community to ensure that political concerns are considered.

In a world where emerging world leaders are running for office and the dissemination of disinformation is rampant, the need for truthful information is as vital as food and water. The Kremlin has no intention of slowing down its disinformation campaigns. To address the looming threat of state-sponsored disinformation, it is imperative that MFAs and embassies maintain an active presence in the digital sphere so that, if necessary, they can adequately devise culturally relevant digital campaigns that work to neutralize disinformation by offering clear and truthful narratives about their country and its values. Just as the Cold War required diplomats to harness the power of public diplomacy to combat the spread of Soviet propaganda via radio, the post-truth era requires government officials to harness the power of social media to combat pro-Kremlin disinformation. Traditional means of communication are not enough to counter today’s information wars. In the new media age, 21st-century battles need to be fought and countered digitally on the very platforms in which they originate.

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