Updated April, 15 2021

 On November the 4^th 2020, America officially withdrew from the Paris Agreement. This decision was the culmination of a long process started by the Trump administration in June 2017. While the decision was applauded by many in America, it also drew criticism from several European leaders and climate commentators alike.

However, the election of Joe Biden as the 46^th president of the United States has renewed European hopes of a revitalised Paris Agreement with the U.S. These hopes were further strengthened when Joe Biden committed to re-joining the agreement upon entering the Oval Office on January the 20^th 2021.

Still, even if Joe Biden is willing to carry out this promise and is able to manoeuvre around a hostile Senate likely to contain a Republican majority, there will remain serious questions about the efficacy and legitimacy of the Paris Agreement.

The Case Against

The case against the Paris Agreement is simple; it does not seem to work. Global emissions were 36.81 Metric Gigatons (Gt)/(bn tons) CO2 in 2019, higher than ever before. Even worse, most studies confirm that we are far away from stopping global temperatures from rising above the ambitious 1.5˚C and below 2˚C.

Based on the massive media backlash against the Trump administration, one would believe that the U.S was behind most of these emissions. However, nothing could be farther from the truth.

Most developed European countries reached their peak in emissions in the early 1990s, and America reached its peak in 2005, far before the signing of the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, America has been one of the most effective developed countries at cutting emissions, even during Trump’s tenure as president. As a result, America saw the largest decline in energy-related CO2 emissions of any country in 2019, with a fall of 140 Mt, or 2.9%, to 4.8 Gt.

According to a report from the Environmental Protection Agency, this drop in emissions was primarily due to the surge in cheap and relatively clean Shale-gas in the U.S. Shale gas is not just cheaper and greener than coal but has also received  supported from the Trump administration.

Critics however, are quick to point out that the emission reductions could have been more significant had the Trump administration not also supported the use of coal, and this is a valid argument. Yet, a report from the International Energy Agency has shown somewhat paradoxically that the main reason for the decline in American coal has been competition from natural gas, which is far cheaper and more accessible.

Other developed countries like Germany have also reduced their emissions greatly and lead the way in the EU with the United Kingdom also seeing a considerable reduction in its aggregate output of CO2. However, these nations represent the outliers. Several other developed nations that were signatories to the Paris Agreement, like Poland, Australia, and Canada have been far worse than America and Germany at cutting emissions.

For developing nations, the results are even worse. China dominates the charts as the world’s largest emitter at 13.92 Gt CO2 in 2019, with India and other developing nations close behind. In fact, emissions from the developing world have increased so much as to nullify all the potential gains from the U.S and EU emission reductions.

China is also leading the world when it comes to coal consumption and production of new coal-based power plants. While Europe and the U.S have been closing coal plants, China has been building more new ones than the rest of the world combined. Furthermore, the amount of electricity being produced in China by coal-fired power plants is more than 1 000 000 Mega Watts, compared to the United States, which had roughly 250 000 MW in 2019.

This goes to show that Trump’s problems with the Paris Agreement, namely, that it disproportionately affected American workers and the American economy while not enforcing the same restrictions on developing nations seems to hold true.  

The Funding Problem

However, emissions were only one part of the Paris Agreement. Another key part was the support to address climate change related damage and mitigation efforts in developing countries, primarily through the Green Climate Fund (GCF). This fund was originally proposed at the 2009 Climate summit in Copenhagen and agreed upon in the 2010 Cancún agreements. In these agreements there was a large effort to get developed nations to pool capital in a common fund that would be used for mitigation efforts in developing nations.

This idea of a Green Climate Fund developed further and was again picked up in the Paris Agreement, eventually becoming an integral part of the agreements funding mechanism. As part of the agreement developed nations agreed to fund the first round of the fund’s resource mobilisation which would last until 2018.

Out of the $100 billion that was supposed to be granted to the fund on a yearly basis by 2020 only a fraction has actually been committed. The initial amount that was given the fund in the Initial Resource Mobilisation (IRM) in 2014 was $10.3bn, which was pledged by 49 nations. Of this initial $10.3bn only $8.2bn was unconditionally confirmed by the giving parties and only $7.2bn materialised after adjusting for exchange rates. This amount is not small, but it still only presents 7.2% of the initial $100 billion.

The second funding period of the fund the: GCF-1 replenishment period, which covers the period between 2020-2023 is not looking much better. The amount dropped to $9.9bn, and the participating parties went from 49 to 31 nations and regions. Most of this funding is still pending parliamentary approval and has yet to materialise. Furthermore, with the current COVID-19 pandemic pressuring national treasuries in developed nations it is hard to know how much of the pledged funding will materialise.

Most of these funding problems have been largely blamed on the Trump administration’s decision to hold back $2 bn in funding. However, this criticism risks missing the forest for the trees. Even with an additional $2 billion dollars the fund would be far away from its initial goal, and the United States has also paid more to the fund than any other developed nation.

The Developed versus The Developing

The real problem behind the lack of funds is the general plan and structure behind the resource mobilisation itself, which like the emission quotas in the Paris Agreement, are built upon an outdated system of developed and developing nations.

This view of Climate Change dates back to the seminal 1992 meeting in Rio de Janeiro, which created the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Although instrumental in enabling international climate action, it also created a static divide between Annex-1 or developed countries and developing countries.

This separation has remained relatively stable with China still being classified as a developing nation, despite its GDP having increased 2900% since 1992. This massive economic growth has also led the nation to become the world’s largest emitter. Still, Chinese negotiators have repeatedly used two arguments to support their ‘developing’ status. 1. Their relatively low emissions per capita and 2. their relatively low accumulated historical emissions. There is some validity to these points, as developed nations like Canada, Australia and the United States have far higher emissions per capita and greenhouse gasses can linger in the atmosphere for 200 years.

Still, these arguments are becoming increasingly invalid. China already has higher emission per capita than the United Kingdom and France, and their per capita emissions are on par with most developed European nations. Furthermore, unlike European and other developed nations the Chinese emissions are growing fast.

Finally, the argument that China should be allowed higher emissions due to their relatively low historical contribution, does not align with perceived existential threat posed by Climate Change. If the goal of climate cooperation is to limit global temperatures from rising beyond 1.5˚C, then historical emissions cannot be used as an excuse for every developing nation to increase their own emissions.

CO2 emissions per Capita

The arguments used by Chinese negotiators are not the real reason for China’s continued status as a developing nation. Instead, the main reason behind China’s protected status is the distribution of structural power within the international climate system itself. As China’s emissions and economic output has increased so has China’s structural power. This means that any new international climate treaty that is signed without China will be limited in its scope as it does not involve the world’s biggest emitter.

Equally, any treaty that China is willing to sign will have to be vague enough that it can conform to China’s own national priorities, and one of these national priorities happens to be the continuation of its definition as a developing nation. This is confirmed in China’s own Nationally Determined Contributions that are delivered to the UNFCCC as part of the Paris Agreement. In it they continually state that the burden of emission reductions needs to be put on developed nations.

The European Union has also realised that they have a limited ability to affect Beijing’s policy, which results in any concessions or even ‘perceived’ concessions from Beijing being met with open arms. The most recent example of this is the praise given to Xi Jinping after he announced that China would try to achieve a peak in emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

Yet, this vague promise remains exactly that a promise. How China will make this change while still constructing new coal-fired powerplants with a life expectancy of 50 years is left unanswered. Furthermore, the history of China’s emission reporting is one of evasion, faulty numbers, and sometimes pure fabrication.

Optimists will argue that the Paris Agreement still has a net beneficial effect. After all, $7.2-9.9bn for climate change mitigation in the developing world may not be as good as $100bn, but it is better than nothing. Equally, any concessions from China is positive, and as we have established any agreement without their support will be stunted. Therefore, they argue that the agreement is a success.

However, there is one glaring mistake with this general approach. If China can increase its emissions until 2030 in compliance with the Paris Agreement, then so will India, Brazil, Vietnam, and Indonesia try to achieve the same level of allowance. This will produce large emissions and create serious problems that will further jeopardise the elusive 1,5˚C target. There is also little evidence that European negotiators realise that these nations will gain greater bargaining power, the higher their emissions become.

Even so the European Union remains adamant that they can change the policy of developing nations by setting a good example to the rest of the world. Yet, if China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia all of which are top emitting countries, does not adopt the European approach to Human rights and Democracy it is unlikely that they will adopt the European approach to emission reductions.

It is also unlikely that developed nations in general, and European nations in particular, reeling from the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic will be able to reach the $100bn Green Climate funding goal anytime soon. Even with renewed American commitments, it seems that new sources for financing will need to be explored. Currently, the Belgian region of Wallonia is a bigger contributor to the GCF than India and China combined, mainly due to the fact that neither nation contributes to the fund, while Wallonia has made a voluntary contribution of $450 000.

Finally, as a core part of the Paris Agreement relies on national reporting of emissions, it is doubtful how successful the future of the agreement will be. The plan is to collect national emission data and compile it in global stock-takes with five years intervals following 2018. These stock-takes beginning in 2023 are meant to be a way of measuring the success of the agreement in general and serve as a building block for future commitments. Still if nations like China cannot be relied upon for these figures, it creates a severe compliance problem with the agreement itself.

With all these problems, it is hard to disagree with Trump’s arguments about the unfair nature of the agreement. Still, what is right in America does not always translate to Europe.

Different Perceptions

There are several key differences between the American situation and the European one. America is largely energy independent due to the large increase in Shale-gas, while Europe is not. As a result, any increase in renewable energy that allows Europe to avoid depending on Russia and its natural gas is good. In contrast, America turning away from gas would be far more expensive and problematic for national security.

Climate Change as a political issue is also far more salient in Europe than in the U.S. The Extinction Rebellion protests of 2019 were just one example that politicians can win votes in Europe by acting against Climate Change, whereas the issue remains politically divisive in the U.S. There are signs that this political difference is changing, with both the Yellow Vest protests in France showing a reluctance against costly climate action, and the Democrats and Republicans becoming more bipartisan on the issue of Climate Change. However, for the time being the green wave is still stronger in Europe.

There are also several geopolitical reasons why the EU might choose to continue with the Paris Agreement. Some studies have found that the EU gains considerably from being a regulatory superpower on the world stage; this regulatory power can easily translate into soft and hard power in favour of the EU.

For example, Ireland and France actively objected against meat imports from Brazil into the EU by referring to the negative effects Brazilian beef had on the climate and the Amazon rainforest. The fact that both countries stood to gain from protecting their role as some of the biggest beef producers within the EU did not even need to be mentioned. There are also several studies showing that the EU has been gaining more from climate policies like Carbon Credit schemes than other participating parties. 

The bottom line is that there are more benefits both domestically for politicians within the EU and for the EU internationally to be perceived as the standard-bearer on Climate Change. However, to believe that these incentives somehow translate internationally or that other nations that have little or none of the same incentives will feel compelled to follow the Paris Agreement to the letter is at best wishful thinking.

Instead, perhaps the European Union could learn a thing or two from the American example. Historically America has refused to accept any international climate treaty that does not call on the developing nations to make solid emission commitments as well. Even Joe Biden seems to embody this approach levelling vague threats about a more forceful approach to emission commitments from developing nations.

These commitments do not need to be equally shared by all developing nations, however both Europe and America need to realise that any classification that includes China, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, South Sudan and Somalia in the same category needs to be updated. If Climate Change is the global threat that the proponents of the Paris Agreement claim, then the response needs to be global as well.