Many have described Latin America as a form of laboratory where different political theories are tested and explored. The region has experienced political ideologies, ranging from fascism to communism, from free markets to state-controlled economies, and today, a new experiment is being tested. Its ramifications might spread far beyond the region. The experiment in question concerns water access. Should it be a human right, public good, or a privately managed commodity?

Water scarcity is a term not often connected with the region. Latin America is home to some 30% of the world’s precipitation and generates 33% of the world’s freshwater. This is despite merely covering 15% of the Earth’s surface. Yet, the region remains exceptionally heterogeneous, containing some of the world’s wettest areas in the form of the Amazon rainforest and the world’s driest in the form of the Atacama desert.

Water conflicts in the region take wildly different forms as a result of geographical heterogeneity. The differences in geography also play a role within nations. Countries like Peru have a water-rich north, while the most populated regions on the pacific coast have far less potable water.

 The region’s wide range of political regimes, leaning from free-market democracies to state-controlled socialist regimes and something in-between, further complicates the picture. Illustrating this dichotomy is Chile, the first nation to completely privatise water in the 1980s, while Ecuador is one of the few countries to enshrine water as a human right in its constitution. As a result of this vast disparity, water disputes are often cast in the light of ideological differences, which both sides use to further their own political narrative.

Poor peasant farmers without water are portrayed as the victims of “evil” multinational corporations who only care about their bottom line. In contrast, the Venezuelan state’s failure to provide ample water to its citizens is seen as a failure of its oppressive socialist regime.

Although pervasive, this hyper politicisation is not always the best way of portraying water scarcity in the region. Instead, the reality of water allocation is far deeper and more complex than a simple left or right political narrative.

For example, Chile, which has privatised water, has higher sanitation standards and better water infrastructure than most Latin American countries, but at far higher costs. On the other hand, despite recognising water as a fundamental human right, Ecuador still allows some private companies to manage water assets and has experienced political protests over water costs and the unequal distribution of water. As a result, we need to examine a few different nations to better understand the situation.

Bolivia

Across the continent, perceived injustices in the form of high water rates and shortages often prompt political turmoil. This was the case in Bolivia in early 2000, when tens of thousands of protesters descended upon the city of Cochabamba, protesting the privatisation of the city’s water services.

The following weeks of protests left one person dead and scores injured, but the local government rescinded the contract with the private company, and the protesters claimed victory. This event, later known as the First Water War of the 21^st Century, helped facilitate the election of Evo Morales and highlighted the political potency of water in the region.

This potency has not lessened since the turn of the century. In 2017 after the worst drought in 25 years, new political protests erupted in Bolivia. This time the anger was focused on the incumbent president Evo Morales, then serving his third term as president.

Morales’ supporters claimed that the drought was largely due to climate change, while his opponents blamed bad government policies, heavy industry, and a lack of water infrastructure investment.

The reality likely lies somewhere in the middle. While it is true that glaciers in the Andes have been melting at alarming rates, it is also true that many cities in Bolivia mainly rely on rainwater and not glacial meltwater for their potable water supply. It is also true that the cities worst affected by the drought, like La Paz, had previously not been exposed to severe droughts, unlike Cochabamba, and were therefore ill-equipped to deal with the situation.

What is clear from the debate surrounding the 2017 drought is the indiscriminate political force of water. Even though Morales is considered left-leaning and generally friendly to indigenous people, he was not beyond reproach when the water stopped flowing.  

Venezuela

To the north of Bolivia in Venezuela, the state is struggling to support its crumbling water infrastructure. The economic collapse of the Venezuelan state has caused widespread water shortages in most major cities, with reliable water access plummeting from 83% in 1998 to only 18% in 2018. This is despite the nation ranking fifteenth of all countries worldwide with natural renewable freshwater resources.

Due mainly to political mismanagement, the situation has become so dire that many citizens have been forced to build their own water storage facilities to collect rainwater. In the nation’s capital of Caracas, poor citizens in some areas have even pooled their resources to create communal water cisterns decoupled from the city’s water grid in order to survive.

Clean potable water has become a luxury in the city, skyrocketing in price, despite strict price controls. The cost of a bottle of water on the black market is around $3 in a nation where the minimum wage is around $8 a month. Furthermore, the socialist regime has been forced to reduce subsidies on water and other consumable goods due to a lack of government funds.

^ People in Caracas collecting water from a storm drain. Photo by Stephanie Vita Marcelot.

Sanitary infrastructure is also crumbling in the nation. Control over wastewater, sewage, and other contaminants is at best lacking and at worst non-existent, providing a dangerous avenue for waterborne diseases. Combined with malnutrition and low access to health services, this creates a perfect storm, exacerbate the water crisis and causing a spike in child mortality. The lack of clean water is also proving to be a big problem in the face of COVID-19, as frequent hand washing has been linked to a lower rate of infection. 

Peru

Across the Amazon rainforest to the west in Peru, the situation is quite different. Unlike Venezuela, where the biggest problem is government policy, Peru suffers from a legacy of geographical issues aggravated by population growth and climate change.

The north-east of the nation is very wet and contains the westernmost region of the Amazon rainforest. Naturally, this region also receives most of the nation’s precipitation. However, despite this, the majority of the population is located on the dry and mainly arid pacific coast.

Exemplifying this unfortunate situation is the nation’s capital of Lima. Home to almost ten million people, it only receives about nine millimetres of rainfall annually, making it one of the largest cities to be situated in a desert.

Naturally, this means that the city relies heavily on precipitation from the Andes region, mainly in the form of the Rimas River watershed, which runs through the metropole. However, around 1.5 million citizens in the greater Lima area still lack reliable access to water despite this river.

Outside of Lima, the situation is only marginally better. Research indicates that around 5 million people, or 15% of the population, lack access to clean water. Again geography plays an important role. While almost 70% of people in Peru live in the Pacific basin, only 2% of the nation’s water naturally drains into it. What little water there is, is further limited by pollution and wasteful water practices.

Anger over water shortages is usually directed against the government, international mining companies, giant dam projects, and large industrial farms. All of which receive blame for the lack of water in the region.

Mining is often singled out, of these four, for its wasteful water management and the pollution of local aquifers. As mining is highly resource-intensive, it requires vast amounts of water for the separation of minerals, dust suppression, and the processing of ore and waste. This has led many activists to claim that the miners use wasteful practices with little regard for the climate or the people.

Tensions between protesters and mining companies often turn violent. According to Human Rights Watch; between 2011 and 2015, clashes between protesters, police and mining companies resulted in 51 people dead. Still, as mining represents 10% of Peru’s Gross National Product and 60% of its exports, it remains a critical industry for the developing nation.

Climate change is another factor that extenuates the water shortage in Peru. Similar to Bolivia, melting glaciers are putting added pressure on the already stressed water system. Furthermore, extreme weather events like flash floods and droughts make the reliance on cisterns and precipitation difficult. However, all is not doom and gloom. Peru is investing in its water infrastructure, and the reintroduction of ancient water techniques is aiding in preserving and collecting water more efficiently.

Chile

As mentioned previously, Chile has a largely privatised water system. This has led to better sanitary standards, better infrastructure, and broader distribution than countries like Venezuela but at far higher costs.

However, the actual effects of privatisation are still debated. Some scholars argue that the government developed the majority of Chile’s water infrastructure in the late 1980s before the final privatisation. Therefore, they claim that privatisation is not the real reason for the Chilean system’s high quality and standards. Although valid, this debate is also beyond the scope of this article. Still, the academic discussion further proves how water privatisation is a contentious topic in Latin America.

Chile also suffers from a similar geographical issue as Peru, regardless of its water infrastructure. The south of Chile contains the majority of the nation’s water resources, while the north is arid and includes the Atacama Desert, the driest place on Earth.

The privatised water system has attempted to solve some of these geographical issues. Still, the system is not too popular in Chile. Water companies are accused of avoiding uneconomic areas outside of urban centres to save money, stealing water from illegal wells during droughts and other misdeeds. These feelings came to a head in 2019 and 2020, when protests against the high costs of living, privatisation, and subway fares rocked the nation.

The resulting fallout from the protests was a reshuffling in the Chilean government and a public debate on the nation’s constitution. The Chilean National Congress responded by signing an agreement in November 2019, which allowed a plebiscite on the constitution to be held in April 2020, this was later pushed to October due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The resulting election resulted in the Pinochet era constitution being repealed. A group of 155 Chileans selected by a second election set for April 2021 will write a new constitution, and many commentators hope this new constitution will stress environmental concerns and remove the statutes protecting private water companies.

Historical Trends

These few case studies show how water is politicised in the region. However, the domestic politicisation of water also illustrates a broader trend that separates water conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) from other developing regions.

Unlike the mainly interstate disputes in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East that we have covered previously, water conflicts in Latin American and the Caribbean are more often intrastate matters. Usually involving a wide range of domestic stakeholders, all levying their own competing water claims.

Historically the region has seen relatively few interstate wars where water has played a direct role. Only one area around the Rio de la Plata has seen repeated conflicts. Starting with the Cisplatine War in the early nineteenth century fought between the Brazilian Empire and the United Provinces of Rio de La Plate (what later became Argentina).

Then in the late 1860s, the War of the Triple Alliance fought between Paraguay on one side and Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil on the other for control over the Platine region. The war was devastating and remains the bloodiest conflict fought in the continent to this day.

However, the lack of water conflict on the interstate level is more likely due to the relative abundance of fresh water in the region rather than any inherent natural pacifist tendencies.

This is supported on the intrastate level, where the story is quite different. Since its inception, the region has seen conflicts between indigenous people, farmers, ranchers, miners, and urban groups over access to water or other resources.

Still, as water resources become more precious, both intrastate and interstate conflicts are likely to increase. Control over water resources will become increasingly important, and consequently, any failure to amply supply and control water will be seen as an apparent failure of the state.

Historically it is not uncommon for Latin American states to blame outside forces, either hostile neighbours, imperialist oppressors, or radical political groups, for domestic turmoil and political failure. Venezuela and Cuba have long blamed any economic, political, or social problems on American interference and imperialism, while more right-leaning nations often blame communist insurgents.

Increased interstate disputes and conflicts are also more likely considering that 29% of people in the region live near transboundary river systems, and although abundant, water is also unequally distributed.

Sixty-eight per cent of the region’s freshwater is located in just three river basins, the Amazon, La Plata, and the Orinoco, all of which cross several borders. If water shortages increase, it is not unlikely that people living in transboundary water systems will see conflict as a means to secure their water supply.

International Treaties

Another issue is the lack of international agreements relating to transboundary water rights in the region. To date, no Latin American nation has signed and ratified either the UN Watercourses Convention or the UNECE Water Conventions. Only Paraguay and Venezuela signed the UN Watercourses Convention, but neither country ratified it.

International treaties are not essential to guarantee peaceful cooperation of water resources, and several scholars have noted that, unlike other regions, water disputes in LAC still remain surprisingly amicable. Scholars cite the general abundance of water and the lack of deep ethnic or sectarian tensions as the main reasons for this development. Several states in the region also have bilateral treaties, which does show some international water diplomacy. Still, the refusal of governments in the LAC to ratify the UN treaties does indicate that their amicability has some limits.

Conclusion

Across Latin America, water shortages are fuelling political conflicts. These conflicts take wildly different forms depending on the nation’s political system and geographical reality. Unlike most regions facing water shortages, the conflicts are mainly intrastate affairs between different domestic stakeholders. However, the history of political blame-gaming and the fact that most water sources are transboundary may hint at potential interstate conflicts in the future. The lack of international water treaties further hints at the mistrust in the region. Still, with ample water supply, Latin America can overcome shortages by embracing innovative conservation policies, crack down on pollution and invest in better infrastructure. The sad reality remains that simply declaring water a human right does little to satiate the thirst of millions of poor people in the region.